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Abstract 
Though typically trivialised by historians, the Eaton Affair preoccupied Andrew 
Jackson throughout his first presidency and lived on in nineteenth-century popular 
memory. This thesis sets aside dismissive, partisan and elitist scholarship, revisiting the 
contemporary evidence to demonstrate the Eaton Affair comprised two distinct scandals. In 
doing so, a heretofore unexamined dissonance between the place of women in mass and 
elite Jacksonian political cultures is also revealed. The clash of these cultures in the Eaton 
Affair would shape both for years to come: stigmatising “petticoat government” among the 
masses while severely curtailing its practice within the informal politicking of Washington. 
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Introduction 
On the evening of September 10th 1829, President Andrew Jackson 
summoned his Cabinet for what would be one of the most extraordinary meetings 
that the White House would ever witness. It would also prove to be their final 
meeting.1 The usual attendees were there: Secretary of State Martin Van Buren, 
Postmaster-General William Barry, Secretary of the Treasury Samuel Ingham, 
Secretary of the Navy John Branch and Attorney-General John Berrien. Also present 
were Andrew Donelson, the President’s private secretary and nephew, and Major 
William Lewis, filling in for the absent Secretary of War John Eaton. Vice-President 
John C. Calhoun was also missing, but this was not uncommon. Like most of the 
political class, Calhoun returned to his home state when Congress was out of 
session. 
At Jackson’s invitation two Presbyterian clergymen were also in attendance: 
Reverend John N. Campbell, the pastor of Jackson’s own church, as well as his old 
acquaintance Reverend Ezra Stiles Ely, who had trekked from Philadelphia at the 
President’s insistence. These were unusual guests for a Cabinet meeting – but then 
they had been convened to discuss an unusual topic. The subject was not any of the 
policy issues usually associated with the Jackson Administration – Indian Removal, 
the Bank War or the Nullification Crisis – but rather the reputation of Margaret 
Eaton, who had married the Secretary of War earlier that year.2  Throughout 1829, 
                                                          
1
 Edward Pessen, Jacksonian America: Society, Personality, Politics (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey 
Press, 1969), p. 308 
2
 Information regarding the Cabinet meeting drawn from: John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John 
Quincy Adams: Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848, Vol. VIII, ed. Charles Francis 
Adams (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co, 1876), pp. 177-8, 206-7; Andrew Jackson to John 
Nicholson Campbell, September 10
th
 1829, in Daniel Feller (ed.), The Papers of Andrew Jackson Vol. 
VII, 1829 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2007), pp. 423-4; James Parton, Life of Andrew 
Jackson: Volume III (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1885[1860]), pp. 203-5; Martin Van 
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malicious gossip had circulated among Washington’s political elite that cast 
Margaret as a “fallen woman” by alleging she had engaged in a long-term extra-
marital affair with John Eaton during her previous marriage to John B. Timberlake.3  
Such rumours were legion: that while Timberlake (a naval officer) was at sea 
Margaret had travelled with Eaton to New York masquerading as husband and 
wife; that Margaret had miscarried when Timberlake was more than a year absent 
and confessed to the attending physician that Eaton was the father; and that 
Timberlake’s mysterious demise in April 1828 off the Spanish coast had been 
suicide, caused by knowledge of his wife’s infidelity. For many of Washington’s 
political elite, these individual incidents merely corroborated their prior suspicions. 
Margaret, a tavern-keeper’s daughter, had long possessed a questionable reputation 
– and the Eatons had not helped their case by marrying upon New Year’s Day 1829, 
long before the customary mourning period for a widow came to a close.4  
 While such alleged episodes of immorality were deplorable enough for a 
tavern-keeper’s daughter, they were positively scandalous in the case of a Cabinet 
wife. By virtue of her marriage to John Eaton and his appointment to Jackson’s 
Cabinet, Margaret had joined the Cabinet ladies at the forefront of Washington’s 
high society. However, key elements of the elite female community (the wives and 
mothers of the political class) refused to risk the ‘contamination’ of ‘the morals of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Buren to James A. Hamilton, September 24
th
 1829, in James A. Hamilton, Reminiscences of James A. 
Hamilton (New York: Charles Scribner & Co, 1869), pp. 146-8.  
3
 Barbara Welter, ‘The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860’, American Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, 
Part 1 (Summer, 1966), pp. 152-4. A ‘fallen woman’ described the converse of nineteenth-century 
ideal womanhood, the ‘true woman’ depicted in the prescriptive literature of the period. 
4
 Ezra Stiles Ely to Andrew Jackson, March 18
th
 1829, in Feller, Papers of Andrew Jackson 1829, pp. 
101-104; Andrew Jackson to Richard K. Call, July 5
th
 1829, in John Spencer Bassett (ed.), 
Correspondence of Andrew Jackson: Volume IV 1829-1832 (Washington DC: Carnegie Institution, 
1929), p. 51; Adams, Memoirs, pp. 159, 178. 
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the country’ that could ensue from admitting a “fallen woman” to their ranks.5 
Accordingly, most of the elite of Washington society snubbed her: Margaret was 
shunned at parties and balls, while visits made by the Eatons went unreturned. Her 
exclusion transcended partisan groupings – members of Jackson’s Cabinet and even 
his family participated in the boycott of the Eatons. Not only did Ingham, Branch 
and Berrien refuse to socialise with the Eatons, so too did Andrew and Emily 
Donelson, his niece and nephew who resided with him in the White House. Yet as 
the majority of Washington’s elite closed their doors to the Eatons, Jackson defied 
community opinion. Not only were the Eatons close friends and political allies, but 
the gossip surrounding Margaret echoed the slanders directed at Jackson’s late wife 
by his political opponents during the 1828 presidential campaign.  
 With the scandal surrounding the Eatons only intensifying over time, 
Jackson hoped this Cabinet meeting would prove a turning point in his campaign in 
their support. Only a week earlier, Jackson had discovered that the chief purveyor 
of these rumours was Campbell, pastor to his own family and the Eatons. Jackson’s 
object was to bring Campbell and Ely, another scandalmonger, before the Cabinet 
and disprove each rumour in detail with evidence he had painstakingly gathered 
over the past months. By doing so, he hoped to force the clergymen to recant and 
thereby convince the recalcitrant members of his family and Cabinet of Margaret’s 
innocence, thus ending their ostracism of the Eatons. Unfortunately for the 
President, the Cabinet meeting did not proceed as planned. It quickly degenerated 
into dysfunction: despite Jackson’s evidence, the clergymen refused to concede that 
Margaret Eaton was ‘a virtuous and persecuted woman.’6 Frustrated, Jackson flew 
                                                          
5
 Parton, Jackson, p. 204. 
6
 Hamilton, Reminiscences, p. 148.  
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into a rage, exclaiming to the assembled company that ‘She is as chaste as a virgin!’ 
– but to no avail.7  
 Instead, the tensions over the Eaton controversy continued to smoulder, 
crippling Jackson’s Administration. The better part of the President’s attention was 
occupied with fruitless efforts to win Margaret’s social acceptance. Indeed, 
according to J. Franklin Jameson, editor of the multi-volume Correspondence of 
Andrew Jackson (1926-1935), the contents of Jackson’s correspondence suggested that 
the ‘question of... Mrs. Eaton’s position in [Washington] held a larger place in the 
President’s thoughts, during at least the first two years of his presidency, than all 
the public interests of the nation combined.’8 In a telling comparison, the 
documentary evidence Jackson gathered to prove her innocence exceeded the 
combined length of all the foreign treaties signed during his entire presidency.9 
Meanwhile, working relationships in the Cabinet suffered as members polarised 
into pro- and anti-Eaton camps. For a time, Eaton and Branch refused to even speak 
to each other.10 Moreover, Jackson refused to convene the Cabinet formally after the 
abortive September meeting, instead relying upon a cadre of unofficial advisers 
including Major Lewis, Amos Kendall and Francis Blair who shared his support for 
the Eatons.11 
As the Jacksonian coalition splintered under the stresses of the scandal, his 
political opposition looked on in delight. The former president John Quincy Adams, 
who remained resident in Washington after his ousting by Jackson, revelled in the 
‘volcanic state of the Administration’ and keenly recorded its ‘internal 
                                                          
7
 Andrew Jackson, quoted in Parton, Jackson, p. 204. 
8
 J. Franklin Jameson, ‘Preface‘ in Bassett, Correspondence , p. iii. 
9
 Queena Pollack, Peggy Eaton: Democracy’s Mistress (New York: Milton, Balch & Company, 1931), 
p. 94. 
10
 Adams, Memoirs, p. 184. 
11
 Pessen, Jacksonian America, pp. 308, 340. 
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commotions.’12 Senator Josiah Johnston and his wife, both confidants of Henry Clay, 
followed the goings-on with ‘some Amusement’ and rejoiced that the ‘party in 
power are in a most desirable state of confusion.’13 Only in April 1831 would 
Jackson finally cut the Gordian knot through his wholesale dissolution and 
replacement of the Cabinet. Even then, Margaret’s role in precipitating the dismissal 
would become the subject of a heated newspaper dispute. For the rest of 1831, the 
nation would be transfixed by the ‘editorial war’ between the two chief Jacksonian 
newspapers in Washington; the United States Telegraph (edited by Duff Green) and 
the Washington Globe (edited by Francis Blair).14  
However distracting and detrimental the scandal was to the Administration, 
the unusual situation also presented uniquely advantageous opportunities. Siding 
with the Eatons in the social dispute was a reliable path to presidential favour, and 
none understood this better than Martin Van Buren.15 Adams observed that Van 
Buren was ‘notoriously engaged in canvassing for the Presidency by paying his 
court to Mrs. Eaton.’16 Though Jackson’s presidency had barely begun, his 
prospective successors – Van Buren and Vice-President Calhoun – had already 
begun manoeuvring for position. In accord with his advocacy for term limits upon 
the presidency, Jackson originally planned to retire after a single term – and his 
poor health placed even that tenure in question.17 Consequently, the Eaton 
                                                          
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Josiah S. Johnston to Henry Clay, September 9
th
 1829, in Robert Seager II (ed.), The Papers of 
Henry Clay Vol. 8: Candidate, Compromiser, Whig 1829-1836 (Kentucky: University of Kentucky 
Press, 1984), p. 98; Eliza Johnston to Henry Clay, December 12
th
 1829, in Seager (ed.), Papers of 
Henry Clay, p. 135. 
14
 United States Telegraph, May 17 1831. 
15
 John F. Marszalek, The Petticoat Affair: Manners, Mutiny, and Sex in Andrew Jackson’s White 
House (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), pp. 181, 198. 
16
 Adams, Memoirs, p. 185. 
17
 Draft of First Annual Message to Congress, in Feller, Papers of Andrew Jackson 1829, p. 604; 
Marszalek, Petticoat Affair, pp. 125, 127; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (New York: 
Book Find Club, 1945), p. 39. 
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controversy became entangled with the question of the presidential succession. This 
was readily apparent to contemporaries. According to Daniel Webster, ‘this dispute 
in the social and fashionable world, is producing great political effects, and may very 
probably determine who shall be successor to the present chief magistrate.’18 While 
Calhoun became identified with the anti-Eaton faction through his wife’s refusal to 
visit Margaret, Van Buren ‘availed himself of the Case of the Lady... to obtain the 
confidence of the President’ and thus ‘prepared himself to succeed to the Jackson 
party to the exclusion of Calhoun.’19 
Though contemporaries considered these events of vital importance, the 
Eaton Affair has been ill-served by historians. During the twentieth century, the 
historiography of the scandal has been dominated by two strands of scholarship – 
the dismissive and the partisan. In the first strand, historians have either judged the 
scandal inconsequential, or conceded it significance only inasmuch as it contributed 
to Van Buren’s presidential succession by causing a breach between Calhoun and 
Jackson. Consequently, this strand has been characterised by a moribund 
historiographical debate over the relative roles of the Eaton Affair, the Seminole 
Controversy and various policy disagreements in producing the Jackson-Calhoun 
split. In the second strand, authors have approached the scandal from a 
biographical perspective, if not format; prioritising the experiences of particular 
protagonists. Accordingly, such scholarship tends to produce partisan defences of 
the course adopted by the chosen character throughout the scandal. Moreover, both 
strands suffer from a blinkered focus upon the experiences of elites. This paper 
seeks to transcend these failed approaches by taking advantage of historiographical 
                                                          
18
 Daniel Webster, quoted in Parton, Jackson, p. 296. 
19
 Josiah S. Johnston to Henry Clay, December 12 1829, in Seager (ed.), Papers of Henry Clay, p. 136. 
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developments in the fields of political and cultural history in order to enhance 
scholarly understanding of the Eaton Affair.  
The role of the Eaton Affair in determining the presidential succession of 
Van Buren over Calhoun underpinned the importance placed upon these events in 
nineteenth-century popular memory. In 1860, Jackson biographer James Parton 
asserted that ‘the political history of the United States, for the last thirty years, dates 
from the moment when the soft hand of Mr. Van Buren touched Mrs. Eaton’s 
knocker.’20 Writing for the Southern Review in 1873, Louis Wigfall (an 
unreconstructed Confederate and adherent of the Lost Cause) argued the scandal 
was more ‘important in its consequences’ than simply the presidential succession. 
In fact, he labelled Margaret Eaton the ‘Doom of the Republic.’21 According to 
Wigfall’s tortured logic, the Jackson-Calhoun breach triggered by the Eaton 
controversy led the Administration to adopt a pro-tariff policy, provoking South 
Carolina into nullifying the tariff law. This set in motion an irrevocable chain of 
events that would culminate in the Civil War; hence Margaret Eaton would 
indirectly ‘work a revolution in the Constitution of the country... consolidate the 
Government, abolish slavery, and cause a war more terrible in its results than that 
which her prototype originated between the Greeks and the Trojans.’22 Though few 
shared Wigfall’s extreme estimation of its significance, it was a widely held belief 
through the nineteenth century that, as the Milwaukee Sentinel noted in 1898, the 
Eaton Affair ‘had altered the current of the country’s history.’23 
                                                          
20
 Parton, Jackson, p. 287. 
21
 Anonymous, ‘Peggy O’Neal; or the Doom of the Republic’, Southern Review, XII (January 1873), p. 
214. David Barbee identifies the unnamed author as onetime US Senator Louis Wigfall; David Rankin 
Barbee, ‘Andrew Jackson and Peggy O’Neale’, Tennessee Historical Quarterly, Vol. 15 (1956), p. 40. 
22
 Anonymous, ‘Doom of the Republic’, p. 221. 
23
 Milwaukee Sentinel, February 7 1898.  
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 This belief, however, did not long survive the advent of the twentieth 
century. As the scandal drifted beyond the reach of popular memory, the emerging 
historical profession failed to accord it a similar pride of place. Baffled by its 
preponderance in Jackson’s correspondence, Jameson spoke for the mainstream 
historical community in 1929 when he deemed the Eaton Affair a ‘matter of little 
consequence to history.’24 His dismissal reflected contemporary academic appraisals 
of scandal as trivial, and thus an unsuitable subject for serious scholarly 
investigation. Typically, such historians relegated scandal to the role of anecdote; 
interspersed throughout matter-of-fact accounts of more consequential events to 
‘enliven’ otherwise dry narratives.25 This low regard for scandals derived from the 
brand of traditional political history that dominated the academy for much of the 
twentieth century, the concerns of which lay elsewhere. The primary 
preoccupations of traditional political historians were the ‘official politics’ of policy, 
and the operations of the ‘formal, institutionalised political system.’26 
 Consequently, the traditional political histories of the Jacksonian period 
have tended to concur with Van Buren’s assessment of the Eaton Affair as ‘in no 
proper sense political’ and remarkable primarily due to the ‘injurious influence’ it 
exerted ‘upon the management of public affairs.’27 Jacksonian historians such as 
Edward Pessen, Harry Watson and Daniel Feller have characterised the scandal as a 
distraction to Jackson then and historians now. According to Pessen, this ‘personal 
squabble’ lacked any ‘larger significance’ and had ‘not the remotest connection to 
                                                          
24
 Jameson, ‘Preface’, p. iii. 
25
 Richard Latner, ‘The Eaton Affair Reconsidered’, Tennessee Historical Quarterly, Vol. 36 (Fall, 
1977), p. 330.  
26
 Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson & David Waldstreicher (eds.), Beyond the Founders: New 
Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic (USA: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004), p. 9. 
27
 Martin Van Buren, The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, Vols. 1 & 2, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1920[1854]), p. 339. 
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the real issues confronting the nation.’28 Watson agreed, relegating it to the status of 
a ‘symbolic issue’ notable only insofar as it ‘hamstrung Jackson’s government’ by 
obstructing harmony in the Cabinet.29 Similarly, Feller mentioned the affair simply 
to note the ‘paralysing’ impact it exerted upon the Administration. 30 
Yet these historians could not dismiss the Eaton Affair entirely. They were 
unable to deny that it was the ‘issue that most occupied Andrew Jackson during his 
first Administration’ given its preponderance in his correspondence.31 To traditional 
political historians, with their focus upon the formal political system and 
conventional political issues, Jackson’s preoccupation seemed irrational – a 
conundrum. The failure of Jackson’s priorities in government to harmonise with 
what they deemed more properly political concerns required an explanation. 
Accordingly, his preoccupation with the Eaton Affair was constructed as an 
idiosyncratic ‘obsession’ peculiar to Jackson’s personality, and thus more the 
province of ‘psycho-analysts’ than historians.32  
In spite of the dismissive attitudes to scandal dominant in the academy, 
popular interest in the Eaton Affair flourished. By the centenary of Jackson’s 
presidency (1829-1837) the divergence between scholarly estimations of the scandal 
and the level of popular interest had become clear. Writing her popular biography 
of Margaret Eaton, Queena Pollack drew upon the manuscript material assembled 
for publication in the Correspondence of Andrew Jackson even as the project’s editor 
                                                          
28
 Pessen, Jacksonian America, pp. 309-10. 
29
 Harry L. Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (United States: Hill and 
Wang, 1990), pp. 100, 104. 
30
 Daniel Feller, The Jacksonian Promise: America, 1815-1840 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1995), p. 162. 
31
 Pessen, Jacksonian America, p. 309. 
32
 Feller, Jacksonian Promise, p. 161; Tim Alan Garrison, ‘Review: The Papers of Andrew Jackson, 
Volumes 7 (1829) and 8 (1830)’, Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Summer, 2012), p. 293. 
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dismissed the scandal as inconsequential to history.33 Simultaneously, the son of 
Margaret’s pastor decided that ‘renewed interest’ warranted the publication of her 
autobiographical manuscript, held by his family for half-a-century.34  
Given this divergence, it is unsurprising that writers confined to the margins 
of academia came to dominate the historiography of the Eaton Affair. 
Unfortunately, these often less-than-scholarly studies tended towards partisanship. 
In this respect, they followed in the footsteps of nineteenth-century authors who 
primarily sought to vindicate the legacies of their favoured protagonists. Wigfall, 
whose regard for Calhoun verged on the hagiographic, won a devoted disciple in 
Southern historian David Barbee. In the 1956 Tennessee Historical Quarterly Barbee 
cast Calhoun as the victim of the ‘Van Buren clique’ who ‘hid behind the dirty skirts 
of an unchaste woman’ to prevent the Vice-President rightfully succeeding 
Jackson.35 Meanwhile, Van Buren authored his own version of events in an 1854 
autobiographical manuscript. In this portrayal, Calhoun and his cohorts had 
‘directed’ the Eaton controversy ‘to the accomplishment of political objects’ – 
namely the Vice-President’s ‘presidential aspirations.’36 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 
briefly addressing the Eaton Affair in his monumental Age of Jackson, took Van 
Buren’s narrative at face value: ‘the partisans of Calhoun took advantage of the 
ambiguous social position of Peggy Eaton to set in motion a complicated intrigue 
with the eventual aim of driving her husband from the cabinet.’37 
The more popular treatments of the Eaton Affair typically took the form of 
biography. Pollack’s 1931 book was followed by another biography of Margaret 
                                                          
33
 Jameson, ‘Preface’, p. iii; Pollack, Democracy’s Mistress, p. 283. 
34
 Virginia Price Deems, in Margaret Eaton, The Autobiography of Peggy Eaton, ed. Charles F. Deems, 
(New York: Arno Press, 1980[1932]), p. vi. 
35
 Barbee, ‘Peggy O’Neale’, pp. 47, 52. 
36
 Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 339, 341. 
37
 Schlesinger, Jackson, p. 54. 
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Eaton by Leon Philips in 1974, while biographies of Emily Donelson were published 
by Paula Wilcox Burke in 1941 and Perpetua Pigott in 1948.  Incensed by the ‘cruel 
misrepresentations’ of Wigfall and Parton, Margaret had produced her own 
‘defence before posterity’ in collaboration with her pastor in 1873, though it 
remained unpublished until 1932.38 In what may have been a reaction to the neglect 
of women in history by male-dominated academia, these biographies were 
predominantly written by and about women. The biographers were driven by a 
diverse set of motivations. Some, like Burke (the great-granddaughter of Emily 
Donelson), were inspired by familial connections. Other authors were more 
politically purposed. For Philips, the saga of Margaret Eaton – who ‘had a greater 
influence on the course of American history than any other member of her sex... 
prior to the modern era’ – was a case in point for the inclusion of women in 
historical writing.39 To Pollack, writing only a decade after female suffrage had been 
achieved in the United States, Margaret’s saga demonstrated that ‘a woman could 
function and must be recognised as an individual political unit’ long ‘before votes 
for women entered the country’s consciousness.’40 
The biographical format as well as the authors’ purposes favoured a partisan 
rendering of events. Given the exclusion of these biographers from the academy, 
their work lacked scholarly rigour, which further fostered partisanship.41 Typically, 
these biographers crafted their narratives from the primary evidence most 
                                                          
38
 Margaret Eaton, Autobiography, pp. vii, 35. 
39
 Leon Philips, That Eaton Woman: In Defense of Peggy O’Neale Eaton (Massachusetts: Barre 
Publishing, 1974), p. 1. 
40
 Pollack, Democracy’s Mistress, pp. 116-117. 
41
 Frequent factual errors testify to this lack of scholarly rigour. Wigfall and Pollack emphasised 
Margaret’s Irish ancestry to exploit stereotypes of Irish domestic servants, though she herself 
asserted her ‘father was not an Irishman.’ Likewise, Philips inserted Calhoun into the September 10 
Cabinet meeting for dramatic effect, despite his absence in South Carolina; Margaret Eaton, 
Autobiography, p. 32; Pollack, Peggy Eaton, p. 3; Philips, That Eaton Woman, p. 82; David R. 
Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (USA: 
Verso, 1999), p. 145.  
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sympathetic to their chosen protagonist while downplaying conflicting accounts. 
Their partisanship was not subtle: Pigott stated her intention ‘to show... that the 
policy she and her husband [Emily and Andrew Donelson] adopted towards the 
Eatons was based on the honest dictates of conscience... uninfluenced by political 
considerations.’42 Likewise, Philips subtitled his book ‘In Defense of Peggy O’Neale 
Eaton.’ 
Though similarly motivated by partisan purposes, Major Lewis and Thomas 
Hart Benton adopted an entirely different strategy to defend the legacy of Andrew 
Jackson. These Jacksonian veterans were not protagonists in the affair, but both 
were privy to the scandal due to their close relationships with Jackson and political 
offices in Washington. When it came time to share their memories of Jackson’s 
presidency with posterity, the role of Margaret in precipitating the Cabinet 
dissolution remained as scandalous in the 1850s as it was two decades prior. To 
shield Jackson’s legacy, they anticipated the approach of traditional political 
historians by largely denying the significance of the Eaton Affair. Benton remained 
silent on the subject throughout his voluminous memoirs.43  Instead, he 
disingenuously attributed the estrangement of Jackson and Calhoun to the Seminole 
Controversy. Though Lewis acknowledged the scandal, he also depicted the 
Seminole Controversy as ‘undoubtedly the main cause of the quarrel.’44 In doing so, 
they rewrote history to cast effect as cause. 
Indeed, a close reading of the available evidence reveals the Seminole 
Controversy was tangential to Jackson’s animosity towards Calhoun. In 1818, then-
                                                          
42
 M. Perpetua Pigott, “Emily Donelson and the Eaton Affair” (M. A. dissertation, Catholic University 
of America, 1948), p. 16. 
43
 Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years in the U.S. Senate: Vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 
1854), pp. 167, 180. 
44
 William B. Lewis, ‘Narrative by Major William B. Lewis, in Parton, Jackson, pp. 310, 327. 
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General Jackson invaded Spanish Florida on his own initiative, sparking 
controversy in the confidential discussions of the Cabinet. As then-Secretary of War, 
Calhoun unsuccessfully recommended censure. While Jackson later admitted 
knowledge of Calhoun’s position as early as 1823, he only confronted Calhoun over 
the incident in May 1830, accusing him of secret sabotage.45 Evidently, Jackson’s 
revival of the issue was a political calculation. His hostility towards Calhoun over 
the Eaton Affair was apparent from late 1829, and the Seminole Controversy served 
as a convenient ‘pretext for breaking with him.’46 Contemporaries were in no doubt 
that the Eaton Affair caused their rupture. Van Buren concluded their antagonism 
‘would... have [n]ever arisen... but for the Eaton imbroglio.’47 Duff Green also 
‘traced... [their] difficulties... to that unfortunate circumstance.’48 
The ploy pioneered by Benton was mimicked by subsequent historians who 
felt it necessary to rationalise their dismissal of the Eaton Affair. According to 
Richard H. Brown, ‘that Van Buren won out over Calhoun... had nothing to do 
fundamentally with Mrs. Eaton.’49 To ascribe the question of the presidential 
succession to ‘personal intrigue’ was to interpret Jacksonian politics ‘in Victorian 
terms.’ In the ‘simple view of history’ of the Victorians, ‘most of history could 
ultimately be attributed either to whores or to the unbridled pursuit of ambition.’50 
Instead, Brown reduced the outcome to a straightforward matter of electoral logic: 
Calhoun brought only South Carolina into the Jacksonian coalition, while Van 
                                                          
45
 Andrew Jackson, ‘Exposition Against Calhoun’, in Benton, Thirty Years, p. 174-5; Andrew Jackson 
to John C. Calhoun, May 13
th
 1830, in Daniel Feller (ed.), The Papers of Andrew Jackson Vol VIII, 1830 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2010), p. 256. 
46
 Andrew Jackson to John Overton, December 31
st
 1829, in Feller, Papers of Andrew Jackson 1829, 
p. 656; Parton, Jackson, pp. 310, 333. 
47
 Van Buren, Autobiography, p. 395. 
48
 Duff Green, quoted in Marszalek, Petticoat Affair, p. 156. 
49
 Richard H. Brown, ‘The Missouri Crisis, Slavery, and the Politics of Jacksonianism’, South Atlantic 
Quarterly, Vol. 65 (Winter, 1966), p. 71. 
50
 Ibid, p. 68. 
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Buren ‘brought all the rest of the South and New York.’51 Likewise, Richard Latner 
argued that the significance of the Eaton controversy had been much exaggerated, 
as ‘considerations of political expediency and principle dictated Jackson’s rejection 
of Calhoun in favour of Van Buren.’52 Moreover, Latner sought to demonstrate that 
the Eaton Affair itself primarily represented a contest over policy differences. To at 
least ‘some degree’ the affair was an ‘expression of southern anti-tariff resentment 
[and] a vehicle for furthering the South’s anti-tariff campaign’ by assailing Eaton 
and Van Buren, who were both widely associated with the passage of the “Tariff of 
Abominations” in 1828.53 This contention reflected one of the basic tenets of 
traditional political history: the primacy of ‘principles and issues’ over ‘ambition 
and rivalry’ in politics.54 
This school of traditional political history has proved enduring. Even in the 
twenty-first century elements of the academy continue to trivialise the Eaton Affair. 
In his recently published biography of Jackson, Sean Wilentz dismisses the scandal 
as ‘a bit of cultural politics.’ Jackson’s ‘obsession’ with Margaret Eaton’s reputation 
‘distracted him from the nation’s business’ and undermined his ‘reform agenda.’55 
Following in this vein is historian Tim Alan Garrison’s review of the most recently 
published editions of The Papers of Andrew Jackson, which contain Jackson’s 
correspondence through 1829-1830. Garrison evinces the same mix of incredulity 
and disdain that Jameson expressed eighty years earlier for Jackson’s ‘obsessive 
correspondence with, and about, the Eatons.’ Echoing Wilentz, he concludes the 
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Eaton controversy did little more than ‘distract [Jackson] from the business of the 
nation.’56 
Both the dismissive and partisan approaches share a preoccupation with 
elite experiences of the scandal. This blinkered focus has resulted in the neglect of 
the second phase of the Eaton Affair; the ‘newspaper war’ between Duff Green’s 
Telegraph and Francis Blair’s Globe over the role of Margaret Eaton in precipitating 
the Cabinet dissolution. Indeed, historian Kirsten Wood notes that historical 
treatments of the scandal ‘often skim over the extensive newspaper war that 
exploded in the summer of 1831.’57 Such scholarship omits the newspaper war 
entirely or addresses it only cursorily – treating it as an epilogue to the Eaton 
controversy, which presumably climaxed with the Cabinet dissolution. As such, 
authors have mentioned it chiefly as testament to the significance of the dissolution. 
For instance, Parton observed the ‘dissolution, its causes, and its consequences, 
were the newspaper topic of the whole summer’ but failed to examine it further, 
while Pigott and Pollack appended chapters detailing an arbitrary selection of press 
responses.58 Van Buren studied the dispute more methodically, but regarded it as 
simply another arena of elite politicking, wholly ignoring the mass audience to 
which this medium was addressed.59 
Though press historians have approached the newspaper war with an 
appreciation of its distinctive format and intended audience, they have studied it in 
isolation from the Eaton controversy. Pasley invoked the dispute as a representative 
example of intraparty factional disputes: ‘when political alliances fell apart, the sure 
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sequel was the founding of a new newspaper.’60 In general press histories, the 
dispute has exemplified the partisan nature of the Jacksonian press. As such, it has 
been the foil against which historical meta-narratives of journalism were charted. 
Simon Sheppard and Michael Schudson tracked the emergence of journalistic 
objectivity, while Gerald Baldasty argued the ‘commercialisation of news’ was the 
chief characteristic differentiating modern (and presumably normative) newspapers 
from their Jacksonian predecessors.61 Instead of being studied as a phenomenon in 
its own right, the newspaper war has been primarily drawn upon to evidence other 
phenomena: whether the import of the Cabinet dismissal or the partisan nature of 
Jacksonian newspapers. 
This paper seeks to move beyond outdated scholarship characterised by 
partisanship, dismissiveness and a narrow-minded focus upon elite experiences. By 
drawing upon the advances of cultural historians and “new” political historians in 
conjunction with a re-evaluation of the primary evidence, it becomes evident that 
the Eaton Affair comprised two distinct, though overlapping, scandals. This study 
has reconstructed the competing narratives disseminated by protagonists during 
both scandals to reveal that women stood in vastly different relation to politics 
within the elite political subculture of Washington as opposed to the perception of 
their role held by the political culture of the masses. After briefly exploring the 
development of elite and mass political cultures along these divergent lines, the 
bulk of this paper shall concentrate upon examining how these two alternatively 
gendered political cultures clashed twice during the Eaton Affair.  
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Challenging the narrow focus of traditional political histories, the approach 
of “new” political historians is characterised by an expanded notion of the political 
and a consciousness of the significance of gender (as well as race and class).62 Such 
scholars recognise that politics ‘encompassed a much more capacious realm’ than 
just the formal institutions of government.63 By identifying the ‘political aspects... of 
social phenomena’ these historians place emphasis on unofficial arenas and 
informal settings as ‘locations of politics’ of equal importance as official channels of 
governance.64  Consequently, a range of political actors have been recognised 
beyond simply office-holders and those situated in the state apparatus. Moreover, if 
politics extends beyond policy and institutions then the concept of political culture 
– the informal norms, practices and ideas of various groups – becomes central. The 
study of the gendering of politics has proved a fertile subfield in such political 
histories, as historians like Joan Scott identify gender as a ‘recurrent reference’ by 
which power is ‘legitimated, conceived and criticised.’ Indeed, she concludes that, 
in a sense, ‘political history has... been enacted on the field of gender.’65 
The emergence of cultural history since the 1980s saw scandal re-appraised 
as a social phenomenon worthy of study and of value to the historian. Dispelling 
vague understandings, historical sociologist Ari Adut postulates an academically 
rigorous definition of scandal: a phenomenon in which a perceived transgression of 
social norms or cultural expectations is exposed to an ‘interested public.’66 Not only 
are scandals deserving of study when, like the Eaton Affair, they demonstrably 
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impact the course of events and act as engines of change, but they are also of 
considerable utility as tools of enquiry. Scandals, by exposing private behaviour to 
public opprobrium, are disruptive social phenomena that provoke debate and 
examination of embedded cultural practices and social norms usually accepted 
implicitly. Consequently, the study of scandal can reveal conflicts and tensions in 
societies otherwise hidden, as well as producing valuable primary material for the 
historian’s use. Indeed, Adut describes scandals as ‘the royal road... to 
understanding the social organisation and cultural code’ of a particular historical 
context.67 Kirsten Wood was the first to suggest such an application for the Eaton 
Affair – as ‘an exceptional lens for viewing the workings of gender and power at the 
start of the Jacksonian era.’68   
Indeed, these approaches bore fruit in the late 1990s, as historians John F. 
Marszalek and Catherine Allgor followed in Wood’s footsteps and began to study 
the Eaton Affair, albeit tentatively. Nor was it coincidental that this sudden surge of 
interest overlapped with another presidential sex scandal.69 While Marszalek 
undertook a systematic study of the minutiae of the scandal, Allgor incorporated it 
within her historical narrative of elite female politicking in the early republic. 
Likewise, Daniel Walker Howe incorporated their research into his period history in 
2007.70 Their studies, however, have hardly exhausted the subject and only hint at 
the untapped potential for further research into the Eaton Affair. Nonetheless, the 
new century has been bereft of fresh scholarship on the subject. Moreover, their 
response to the diversity of contradictory accounts of the scandal has hindered 
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scholarly understanding of the Eaton Affair. Their purpose – producing cohesive, 
explanatory narratives of the scandal – has led historians to elide the conflicts 
among these sources by synthesising them into an organic whole. 
This paper avoids such pitfalls by recalibrating its approach to scrutinise the 
stories told by various protagonists during the Eaton Affair. It also prioritises 
contemporary evidence over narratives written in retrospect, which impose an 
artificial coherence upon events that reflect the concerns of an entirely different 
context. An examination of contemporary sources suggests that these accounts 
themselves constituted a second (and underexamined) dimension of the dispute, in 
which protagonists deployed gendered narratives to persuade particular audiences 
to endorse their positions.  Instead of mining them as source material, this paper 
reassembles the available evidence to reconstruct these narratives. In light of their 
original context – embedded in a political arena and circulated in competition with 
other narratives – they have been presented in parallel. Based on the varying 
mediums, intended audiences and concerns of authors, it is apparent that the Eaton 
Affair produced two distinct sets of narratives: those circulated via letters among an 
elite audience from the January 1829 Eaton marriage until the April 1831 Cabinet 
dissolution, and those published to a mass audience via the press after the 
dissolution and throughout 1831. The Eaton Affair, in fact, constituted two distinct, 
yet overlapping scandals: a furore among the political elite over Margaret Eaton’s 
place in Washington society, followed by a bitter newspaper dispute over her role 
in precipitating the Cabinet dissolution. 
The first and second scandals stemmed from violations of the gender norms 
and expectations of elite and mass political cultures respectively, each of which held 
distinctive conceptions of the relationship of women to politics. The elite political 
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subculture of the ruling classes at Washington tacitly accepted the covert political 
power wielded by high-ranking women, while in the incipient democratic culture of 
the masses political activity increasingly possessed masculine overtones. Andrew 
Jackson, a product of mass political culture and outsider to the ‘parlor politics’ of 
Washington, defied the traditional prerogatives of elite women to regulate social 
intercourse when he sought the acceptance of the allegedly immoral interloper 
Margaret Eaton into their society.71 Caught in an impasse, the elite women cast their 
ostracism of Margaret as an act of disinterested moral censorship, while Jackson 
portrayed it as a male-motivated political conspiracy. Two years later, Duff Green 
publicised the role of Margaret – a woman – in causing the unprecedented Cabinet 
dissolution in order to discredit the Jackson Administration and thus further the 
presidential ambitions of his patron, Vice-President Calhoun. Her defenders 
ineffectively rebutted Green’s narrative of malign female influence by alternatively 
depicting Margaret as the incarnation of injured female innocence.  
The reinterpretation of the Eaton Affair outlined in this study both reiterates 
the centrality of gender to Jacksonian political culture and throws the heretofore 
unexplored dissonance between elite and mass political culture into stark relief. 
Though prior historians such as Norma Basch, Kirsten Wood and Michael Pierson 
have recognised the significance of gender in Jacksonian political culture, the 
disjuncture between the gender paradigms of the political leadership and their 
constituents remains uncharted.72 Instead, they have focused upon identifying and 
charting a divergence between the ‘gender culture[s]’ of the antebellum political 
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parties.73 In fact, Wood has even highlighted the contribution of the Eaton Affair, 
occurring as political alignments were solidifying into the Second Party System of 
Whigs versus Democrats, to this partisan divergence.74 Yet even as this “horizontal” 
divergence between political parties has been thoroughly explored, little attention 
has been paid thus far to the concomitant “vertical” divide between the gender 
roles, norms and expectations of the nation’s political elites and the electorate to 
which they were accountable. This divergence became particularly pronounced into 
the 1820s, as democratic currents of thought came to dominate mass political 
culture even as the elite political culture of Washington adhered to notions of 
republicanism that were becoming increasingly antique within the wider nation.   
Though the political arrangements and governmental structures of 
European monarchies had been resoundingly rejected by the Revolution, it had not 
resolved the question of what form of government would replace them. According 
to the ‘theories of pure republicanism’ upon which the Founding Fathers modelled 
the government created by the Constitution, the citizenry had delegated their 
collective power to representatives who would maximise the public welfare.75 These 
representatives were drawn from the nation’s elite who, rather than seeking power 
for its own sake, had been reluctantly raised to public office by their fellow citizens 
who recognised their exemplary civic virtue and patriotism.76 They came together in 
a deliberative body to determine policy through debate, reason and compromise in 
full view of their constituents. While popular consent was acknowledged as the 
source of governmental authority, the role of the people was limited to guarding 
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their liberties by holding their representatives accountable for any abuses at 
periodic elections.77 Though the ‘doctrine of popular sovereignty’ had been 
established beyond dispute by the Revolution, far more radical interpretations of 
this doctrine simmered beneath the surface of the founders’ ideal republic.78  
The revolutionary victory did not herald the dawn of popular rule in the 
United States. The path to democracy would be winding, with many pitfalls and 
dead-ends, before the concept was realised in the early nineteenth century, if only in 
a limited sense. Democratic currents of thought remained marginal within political 
culture through the 1780s and 1790s; during this period “democrat” was an epithet. 
Yet by the first decade of the nineteenth century it became a compliment.79 Broader 
acceptance within the political mainstream, however, had only been achieved by 
stripping democratic thought of its more radical connotations (i.e. cosmopolitanism, 
abolitionism, racial egalitarianism).80 Instead, the consensus meaning of democracy 
became a polity of white men who participated through the act of voting. Once this 
shift occurred, democratic thought came to dominate mass political culture into the 
1810s and 1820s. This democratic impulse from below achieved tangible gains at an 
institutional level. Suffrage for white males became virtually universal as state 
constitutional conventions convened during these decades to expand the franchise 
to ‘every white male citizen.’81 Moreover, popular voting for presidential electors 
became the norm as state legislatures gradually surrendered this role to the 
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people.82 The opening of such avenues spurred the highest levels of political 
engagement in American history; with historian Jean Baker arguing that ‘public 
affairs replaced spiritual matters at the center of many a white male’s universe.’83 
This democratisation of mass political culture was accompanied by its 
“masculinisation.” In the post-revolutionary republic, the franchise was restricted 
by property qualifications – regarded as a privilege of class rather than right of 
manhood.84 For instance, for thirty years after the Revolution women in New Jersey 
could vote if they met the requisite property requirements.85 According to the 
classical republican rationale, the vote could only be entrusted to those citizens who 
possessed economic independence, and thus possessed a stake in society and were 
less susceptible to corruption or demagoguery.86 However, voting was not yet 
regarded as the ‘sine qua non of political participation’ but rather as ‘one of many 
vehicles’ for political expression.87 Those not considered independent, such as 
poorer whites, women and blacks, could participate in the ‘capacious realm’ of a 
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‘politics of out of doors and in the streets’ i.e. symbolic activities such as public 
festivals, demonstrations, parades, commemorations, etc.88  
The republican rationale was increasingly replaced by an alternate reasoning 
that justified the extension of suffrage to all white men regardless of class. The 
prevailing notion of manhood in the antebellum period increasingly defined 
masculinity through ‘self-discipline... and self-control’ via the mastery of ‘bodily 
desires and passions.’89 Those capable of such ‘personal self-government were held 
responsible enough to vote.’90 This rationale simultaneously barred those who 
supposedly lacked such self-mastery – i.e. women, blacks – from membership in the 
polity. Meanwhile, as the ranks of voters swelled to include almost all white men, 
alternative avenues of political expression became moribund.91 Accordingly, the 
bounds of the political community were increasingly demarcated by gender and 
race, rather than class, heralding the shift towards the reconceptualisation of 
political work as an exclusively masculine concern.92 
This masculinisation of politics transpired in parallel with the emergence of 
the immensely influential doctrine of the separate spheres. Premised upon the 
notion of natural difference, this ideal constructed reality as a series of ‘gendered 
dichotomies’ – such as politics versus society, public versus private and masculine 
versus feminine.93 According to Alexis de Tocqueville, who toured the United States 
in 1831, democratic America recognised the natural differences between ‘physical 
and moral constitution of man and woman’ and, as a result, ‘carefully divid[ed] the 
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duties of man from those of woman.’94 Through their association with gender, the 
political (public) and social (private) spheres were understood as diametrically 
opposite, and defined against each other.95 In turn, this opposition informed gender 
roles, defining the public realm of politics and commerce as masculine and 
relegating women to the privacy of their domestic domain. Though, as many 
historians have observed, this popular discourse did not necessarily describe the 
reality of existence, it did exert a strong influence on perceptions of legitimate 
behaviour.96 
Insulated from the democratic currents overtaking mass political culture, the 
elite political culture of Washington developed along distinctive and divergent lines 
through the 1820s. The politics of the capital centred upon networks of personal 
relationships managed through socialising.97 Despite republican ideals which 
situated politics firmly within the public sphere, political necessity drove the 
adoption of an “informal politicking” in which essential political work was 
accomplished in ostensibly social venues. Tasks that later became functions of 
institutionalised political parties – such as winning support for legislative 
initiatives, seeking and dispensing patronage, formulating alliances and devising 
compromises – were performed through the informal politicking that took place in 
the private realm of social events. Unofficial social gatherings – such as public 
levées, dinner parties, drawing rooms, exchanges of visits and the like – became 
indispensable political spaces in which the ruling class could mingle in a relaxed 
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atmosphere away from the public eye, in a process described by historian Joanne 
Freeman as the ‘politicisation of socialising.’98  
By virtue of their familial or marital ties to male politicians, elite women 
were present at such occasions. In fact, female attendance was crucial as the 
presence of these ‘social beings’ defined an event as non-political.99 Simultaneously, 
their presence granted high-ranking women access to the ‘pathways of political 
power.’100 In such settings, elite females became political actors; privy to networks 
of information, patronage and alliances that could be strategically employed to 
advance the political agendas of their male relations. 
In the privacy of letters, such women acknowledged and even celebrated the 
political sway they possessed. Washington socialite Margaret Bayard Smith revelled 
in the fact that ‘among the rulers of the people... women are gaining more than their 
share of power.’101 Likewise, Philadelphia socialite Rebecca Gratz, writing to her 
sister-in-law Maria Gratz, praised her upon the ‘influence at court’ she wielded 
through politicians such as Henry Clay and Francis Blair. Erroneously expecting 
Clay’s victory in the 1832 presidential election, Gratz predicted her sister-in-law 
would sit ‘at the right hand of the next president.’102 Touring British actress Fanny 
Kemble observed their proclivity for politics, describing the ‘wives and daughters... 
of all the leading political men of the Union’ as ‘lady-politicians’ in their own 
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right.103 Their political influence, however, could not be openly acknowledged, 
existing in what Catherine Allgor describes as an ‘atmosphere of denial.’104  
To openly acknowledge the political power of elite women would be an 
admission of the existence of Washington’s informal politicking and its 
corresponding failure to live up to republican ideals. The mingling of public and 
private spheres implicit in such politicking was dangerously reminiscent of the 
‘court politics’ of Europe.105 In fact, the chief characteristic of monarchies, which 
distinguished them from republics, was the lack of ‘distinction between public and 
private spheres of activity.’106 Only in such scenarios could female influence flourish 
through the medium of familial, marital or sexual relationships.107 As such, the 
spectre of female influence served as a ‘rhetorical lightning rod’ for anxieties 
surrounding the practices of aristocratic politicking. The contradiction between 
republican ideals and the realities of elite politicking generated a latent antipathy 
towards female influence among male elites.108 This antipathy, though tempered by 
necessity and familiarity with the status quo, underpinned the covert nature of 
female influence.  
The ‘studied silence’ surrounding elite female power, coupled with their 
lack of first-hand experience of Washington’s political culture, meant that the 
divergent gender paradigms of elite and mass political culture remained invisible to 
most Americans.109 By 1828, three key factors – expanded suffrage, popular 
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presidential voting and a viable partisan opposition – came into alignment, enabling 
the democratic impulse to make itself felt on the national stage through the election 
of Andrew Jackson.  His election marked the end of the era in which elite and mass 
political cultures could operate in seamless parallel with their contradictions 
concealed from the electorate.  
The clash of these cultures in the Eaton Affair would shape the dynamic 
between women and politics for decades to come. Though not all the gendered 
narratives deployed during the Eaton Affair shared the visceral hostility to female 
power demonstrated and disseminated by Duff Green’s narrative of malign 
influence, they all shared a bedrock assumption: that politics was a masculine 
realm, in which women had no place. This masculine model of politics was 
articulated by these narratives in the elite arena and the public sphere; contributing 
to the curtailment of elite female power and the excision of ordinary women from 
the body politic.  
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Fig. 1: Immense crowds descended upon Washington for Andrew Jackson’s 
inauguration on March 4th 1829, seen here in this depiction of the post-
inaugural public reception held at the White House. 
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Chapter 1: Moral Censorship or Political Conspiracy? 
 The inauguration of Andrew Jackson on the fourth of March, 1829, saw 
democracy in the ascendant. Scenes of Jackson’s inauguration are a staple of 
historians’ accounts; encapsulating the triumph of the democratic revolution which 
Jackson embodied and the beginning of the age to which he lent his name.110 This 
sentiment was shared by contemporaries. According to Margaret Bayard Smith, a 
long-time resident of Washington, it had been ‘the People’s day, and the People’s 
President, and the People would rule.’111 Certainly the event was considered 
momentous by average Americans.112 Crowds drawn from every region and every 
class in the Union converged upon the Capitol – ‘Country men, farmers, 
gentlemen... boys, women and children, black and white’ of ‘the North... the West 
and the South.’113 After he gave his inaugural address and took the oath of office 
from the Chief Justice, Jackson made a telling gesture. After kissing the Bible upon 
which he had sworn his oath, the President turned towards the crowd and bowed 
‘to the people... in all their majesty.’114 Francis Scott Key, an eyewitness, pronounced 
the spectacle sublime.115  
 If Jackson’s background was the gauge, then his elevation to the presidency 
was certainly revolutionary. He epitomised the ideal of the self-made man; 
orphaned during the Revolutionary War, Jackson achieved prominence as a lawyer 
on the Tennessee frontier before winning national fame through his lopsided 
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victory over the British at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815.116 Jackson’s democratic 
bona fides were all the more convincing when compared to that of his opponent, the 
presidential incumbent John Quincy Adams. Born into privilege, Adams was the 
son of former president John Adams, and had accomplished a distinguished 
diplomatic career before his eight-year tenure as Secretary of State.117 The contrast 
between Jackson, the man of the people, and Adams, who was successfully depicted 
as aristocratic, was central to the election outcome.118 Indeed, Jackson’s chief 
newspaper editor Duff Green labelled Adams ‘King John II.’119 In comparison to 
previous holders of the office, Jackson was an outsider to the presidency and to 
Washington.120 Typically, prior Presidents had served in the Cabinets of their 
predecessors and often had much legislative or executive experience besides, 
leading Parton to label them the ‘Secretary Dynasty.’121 Meanwhile, Jackson’s only 
Washington experience was a partial Senate term (1823-5) during his unsuccessful 
1824 tilt at the presidency.  
 Though Jackson’s inauguration may have been sublime and his election 
revolutionary, the political culture of Washington could not be rebuilt in a day. 
Nonetheless, Washington’s established elites met both with trepidation. After the 
scenes upon the Capitol, Jackson returned to the White House for further 
celebrations. Crowds of twenty-thousand people, over half again the usual 
population of Washington, followed him there.122 Only ‘Ladies and gentlemen’ had 
been expected ‘at this Levee, not the people en masse.’123 Smith was shocked by the 
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resultant scenes: ‘The Majesty of the People had disappeared, and a rabble, a mob, of 
boys, negros, women, children, scrambling fighting, romping... The President [was] 
nearly pressed to death and almost suffocated and torn to pieces by the people in 
their eagerness to shake hands with Old Hickory.’124 To long-time residents of the 
capital entrenched in its elite political culture, such scenes embodied the democratic 
currents overtaking American society; a fearful prospect to these elites. To Smith, 
the ‘rabble in the Presidents House’ evoked ‘the mobs in the Tuileries and at 
Versailles’ and aroused fears that ‘the People... the most ferocious, cruel and 
despotic... of all tyrants’ could ‘put down all rule and rulers.’125 Likewise, Supreme 
Court Justice Joseph Story was appalled: ‘The reign of KING MOB seemed 
triumphant.’126 
 Far more consequential for the clash between the democratic political 
culture embodied by Andrew Jackson and the republican culture of Washington’s 
established elites were the scenes that marred the Inaugural Ball that evening.127 
During the ball, many of Washington’s elite ladies avoided one woman in particular 
– Margaret Eaton, wife of newly appointed Secretary of War John Eaton. Even 
sitting by them at the supper-table, Margaret was pointedly snubbed by Smith, 
Floride Calhoun (wife of Vice-President Calhoun) and Deborah Ingham (wife of 
Treasury Secretary Samuel Ingham).128 This ostracism was not new; it dated back to 
Margaret’s marriage to Eaton a full two months earlier. At the time, the ‘ladies 
declare[d] they will not go to the wedding, and if they can help it will not let their 
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husbands go.’129 As one eyewitness later observed, the controversy surrounding 
Margaret would ‘cost the President and his sage counscles more trouble than all the 
other subjects brought before them during the present administration.’130 
This controversy caused such trouble because it extended far beyond social 
snubs and unreturned visits. This chapter focuses upon a more important (and 
underexamined) dimension of the conflict; how Jackson and elite women 
promulgated competing narratives to define the meaning and motivation of 
Margaret’s ostracism. The reception of these narratives among political elites would 
prove crucial in determining whether elite female power (however covert) would 
remain a fixture of the capital, or whether Jackson’s hostility towards informal 
politicking would expunge their influence from Washington’s political culture. To 
conclude, this chapter will trace how various figures altered and appropriated these 
narratives of moral censorship and political conspiracy to advance their own 
agendas. 
 Even before his marriage to Margaret, John Eaton feared a backlash from the 
Washington establishment. For most of the 1820s, Margaret lived in her father’s 
boarding house in Washington as her husband was so often at sea. Staying at the 
same boarding house during his Senate tenure from 1818-1829, Eaton and Margaret 
became well acquainted. The resultant rumours of an extra-marital affair earned 
Margaret ‘the censure... of a gossiping world.’131 According to Smith, Margaret’s 
reputation had been ‘totally destroyed’ by ‘her previous connection with him both 
before and after her husband’s death.’132 After her husband died in 1828, Eaton 
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hoped to wed the newly widowed Margaret. Uncertain of the proprieties and 
fearful of the reaction of the ‘City gossippers’ he turned to Jackson for advice.133 
Jackson was a natural port of call: Eaton had been one of his protégés since their 
military service together in the 1810s, and Jackson had also come to know Margaret 
during his brief Senate term.134 Jackson’s response was characteristically firm: 
‘Marry her and then you will be a position to defend her.’135 To Jackson, ‘the very 
act of his marrying her was proof’ of Eaton’s belief in her virtue, which would ‘put 
down... the gossips of the city.’136 His resolve to appoint Eaton to the Cabinet was 
only strengthened by the warnings of supporters that controversy over Margaret 
could become a ‘source of annoyance’ (a severe understatement) to the 
Administration.137 
 These responses were also characteristic of Jackson’s incomprehension of the 
elite political culture of the capital. As an outsider to this culture, Jackson had 
reacted with distaste and disillusionment when he was first exposed to the informal 
politicking practices of Washington during his brief Senate term. Writing to his wife 
Rachel, Jackson complained that there ‘is nothing done here but vissitting and 
carding each other... scenes’ which ‘disgusted’ him.138 The exchange of regular, 
ceremonial visits (which came to involve elaborate calling cards) between families 
maintained the social networks that underpinned Washington’s informal 
politicking.139 It also served as a disguised political space. For instance, the French 
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ambassador once remarked to Smith that he often desired to visit her but they ‘had 
so many politics at [her] house, he was afraid a Frenchman might be a restraint.’140 
Already distrustful of such politicking as a departure from republican ideals and 
dangerously reminiscent of court politics, Jackson’s sentiments were only 
strengthened by his narrow loss in the 1824 presidential election.  
 As none of the candidates had secured an electoral vote majority, the task of 
selecting the sixth President fell to the House of Representatives in accordance with 
the Twelfth Amendment. As all claimed membership in the Jeffersonian-Republican 
party, their prospects rested upon the success of their informal politicking.141 
Confident that his plurality of popular and electoral votes signified he was the 
choice of ‘the free and unsolicited voice of the people,’ Jackson disdained such 
‘intrigue’ and held himself aloof from that ‘unclean procedure.’142 Nevertheless, the 
House gave John Quincy Adams the presidency. Outraged, Jackson alleged the 
‘voice of the people’ was ‘disregarded’ through a “corrupt bargain” between 
Adams and then-House Speaker Henry Clay.143 Adams had repaid Clay’s 
congressional support by appointing him Secretary of State, the traditional 
stepping-stone to the presidency.144 
 Jackson’s refusal to adapt to Washington’s signature political culture was 
not a personal failing. Rather, it stemmed from the wider dissonance between the 
realities of elite politicking and the norms and expectations of the mass political 
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culture into which Jackson had been socialised. John Coffee, a neighbouring 
Tennessee planter and close friend, shared Jackson’s reaction towards elite 
politicking. In a letter to his wife written on a visit to Washington during Jackson’s 
presidency, he seemed perplexed by the ‘constant stream of visits and revisits,’ and 
remarked disapprovingly, ‘the ladies perform a considerable part in the drama 
here.’145  
This divergence was evident even in the language of these distinct political 
cultures – for instance, the differing meanings of the term “court” in the 1820s and 
1830s. Among the political elite, court described the unofficial social-political arena 
of Washington in a matter-of-fact sense.  Rebecca Gratz, discussing Francis Blair’s 
wife, described her as ‘one of the most popular Ladys at Court.’ Likewise, she also 
praised her sister-in-law’s ‘influence at court.’146 One congressman, apprising Clay 
of Van Buren’s presidential prospects, labelled him ‘the first favorite at Court.’147 
Smith, lamenting her lack of intimacy with the Jackson Administration, described 
herself and her husband as ‘not in favour at court.’148  
Conversely, in wider usage court referred to European-style aristocratic 
governance, from which derived its negative connotations and rhetorical value 
within mass political culture. John Brown, an otherwise unremarkable 
Revolutionary veteran and Jackson voter, wrote to the newly inaugurated President 
with congratulations and advice. Brown lambasted Jackson’s predecessors for the 
practice of presidential levées, which smacked of ‘Court Ettiquett’ and was thus 
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‘antirepublican in its nature.’ The ‘genious of Republican goverment’ was at odds 
‘with the court at Washington City... the most pompous court on Earth’ and so 
Brown concluded that there was ‘much need of reform’ on Jackson’s part.149 In the 
1832 campaign, such language was even deployed as a line of attack against Jackson 
himself. One incendiary political cartoon depicted Jackson as a monarchic figure: 
trampling the Constitution underfoot as he presided in kingly attire over the ‘Court 
of King Andrew the First.’150 Indeed, in 1834 Jackson’s political opponents would 
term themselves the Whigs, after the revolutionaries who had opposed King George 
III.151 
The impasse over Margaret Eaton’s admission into Washington society 
again demonstrated that Jackson’s outlook was firmly rooted in the masculine and 
democratic political culture of the masses. Instead of deferring to the elite female 
prerogative to regulate social intercourse, Jackson embarked upon a crusade to win 
Margaret’s acceptance into society.  However, once the Washington ladies 
ostracised Margaret, they could not set a precedent by acceding to the ‘despotism of 
the President’s will.’152 Moreover, their presumed moral supremacy grounded elite 
female claims to authority – so accepting a woman they had already branded 
“fallen” would undermine this foundation and diminish their influence. Somewhat 
inadvertently, then, the question of Margaret’s place in society assumed a far 
deeper significance; transmuting into a contest over who would command the 
social spaces of Washington: whether female elites would retain their social 
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prerogatives under the new regime, or Jackson assert control over the capital’s 
informal politicking as he had over the formal apparatus of the state.  
This contest, personified in Margaret’s struggle for social acceptance, would 
be decided by the success of each party in rallying the political elite behind their 
position. To win support, both Jacksonians and the Washington ladies crafted 
narratives that legitimated their positions while delegitimizing those of their 
opponents. The majority of surviving accounts of the Eaton Affair were produced 
for precisely this purpose. Given the nature of gossip and scandal, many 
Washingtonians were too circumspect to produce documentary records except from 
necessity. Accordingly, these narratives have been largely reconstructed from letters 
written to recipients far from the capital. Such letters simultaneously captured the 
narratives circulated by word of mouth in Washington, even as they were vehicles 
for their dissemination to distant audiences of political elites. 
It was a common nineteenth-century practice to circulate letters beyond their 
addressed recipients. For instance, one Jacksonian shared a letter from the 
President-elect with Smith simply to satisfy her curiosity over his handwriting.153 
Letters intended solely for the eyes of their addressee were the exception, illustrated 
by the custom whereby such missives were marked ‘private’ or ‘confidential.’154 For 
politicians, the ‘public-minded personal letter’ intended for circulation ‘among 
small numbers of elite readers’ was an effective political tool.155 Indeed, Andrew 
Donelson highlighted the influence letters could have ‘on the public mind.’156 This 
medium imparted the impressions of sincerity and candour expected of a private 
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missive to a trusted intimate to what was, in fact, a carefully crafted political 
communication. Nor was this stratagem exclusively employed by male politicians. 
As Catherine Allgor observes, elite women also disguised political communications 
as private correspondence in anticipation of its dissemination among ‘wider circles 
of friends and family.’157 This was certainly true of Margaret Bayard Smith, whose 
letters constitute most of the surviving source material for the Washington ladies’ 
narrative. 
In order to legitimate and garner support for their boycott of the Eatons, the 
Washington ladies situated their act within the framework of female moral 
supremacy and domestic duty. They exploited a key tenet of the separate spheres 
discourse: women’s moral superiority over men. This grounded claims that women 
had a ‘moral and social duty’ to regulate social intercourse on behalf of their 
family.158 Even Jackson accepted that morality was the particular province of 
women. In 1817, he advised the adolescent Donelson to ‘alone intermix’ with 
‘virtuous females’ as ‘the society of the virtuous female enobles the mind, cultivates 
your manners, & prepares the mind for the achievement of every thing great, 
virtuous, & honourable.’ Conversely, Donelson should ‘shun the intercourse of the 
others [immoral women]’ which ‘engenders corruption, & contaminates the 
morals.’159 
In her letters, Smith adopted a similar rationale to justify the refusal of the 
‘virtuous and distinguished women’ of Washington to grant Margaret Eaton 
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‘admission into society.’160 The issue in question was ‘not so much about Mrs. E’ but 
rather turned upon ‘the principle, whether vice shall be countenanced.’161 Cabinet 
ladies stood at the forefront of Washington society, and in such a position the 
capacity of an immoral or “fallen” woman to ‘contaminate the morals’ would be 
magnified commensurately.162 According to community opinion, Margaret was 
such a woman – one ‘who has left her strait and narrow path’ – and consequently, 
had ‘never been admitted into good society.’ Neither her marriage to Eaton nor the 
‘President’s wishes’ altered these facts, and consequently, ‘a noble stand... [was] 
made by the Ladies of Washington’ who neither acknowledged her at ‘public 
occasions’ nor visited her privately.163  
Nor did such boycotts lack for precedent. Smith recorded an earlier incident 
where an inappropriately dressed woman was frozen out by the ‘ladies... [who] 
sent... word, if she wished to meet them... she must promise to have more clothes 
on.’164 Moreover, women practised similar roles in contemporary society more 
generally.165 The ‘peculiar nation of Washington society’ as a town devoted entirely 
to government meant that in the capital such boycotts could take on political 
ramifications.166 This meant that, as in the case of Margaret Eaton, they could also be 
staged for political purposes. 
 The narrative of disinterested moral policing elegantly concealed the deeper 
political motives for the ostracism. Second only to the burgeoning Eaton Affair, 
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Smith’s correspondence of early 1829 was dominated by grief and resentment over 
the impending upheaval to Washington society that would occur once Jackson took 
office.167 Jackson’s election signified a regime change on a scale unmatched since 
Thomas Jefferson took power from the Federalists in 1801.168 Since then, the 
presidency had stayed in the hands of the Jeffersonian-Republican party, which 
absorbed the opposing Federalists (and their policies) after the War of 1812.169 This 
“Era of Good Feelings” was abruptly cut short by the partisan warfare waged by 
Jacksonians after their champion was deprived of the presidency by Adams and 
Clay in 1825.170 Consequently, a ‘general gloom’ existed over what ‘change[s] will 
take place in our society.’171 The 20th Congress would adjourn and their families and 
those of Adams’ Cabinet – ‘those of the first distinction... who gave a tone to society’ 
– would depart.172 Moreover, Jackson instituted a policy of ‘rotation in office’ for 
executive appointments, forcing many long-established Washington families, 
lacking other financial support, to emigrate.173 Smith predicted she would ‘cry all 
day long on the 4th of March’ because of the ‘many excellent families we shall 
lose.’174 Nor was this resentment restricted to Smith. Mary Chase, daughter of a 
Supreme Court Justice, overcame the ‘natural timidity of her sex’ to author a savage 
critique of what became popularly known as the “spoils system” after her husband, 
an Adams supporter, was dismissed.175 In part, then, the boycott was likely actuated 
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by ‘displaced aggression’ vented upon ‘the women closest to Andrew Jackson and... 
representative of his regime.’176 
 The boycott was not simply an attack upon Jackson borne of fear and 
resentment, but simultaneously served to consolidate the authority of the elite 
female community in the face of further changes. Ostracising Margaret 
communicated the norms and expectations of elite political culture to the influx of 
newcomers associated with the Jackson Administration, and acted as an avenue 
whereby they could ingratiate themselves into established Washington society. For 
example, Donelson told John Eaton that ‘the circle in which Mrs D had been... 
thrown when she arrived in the city had embarrassed... her disposition to be social 
and free with your lady.’ As such, the Donelsons would defer to the ‘sentiments of 
others’ who possessed ‘a longer acquaintance with society here’ to avoid ‘endless 
disputes.’177 Initially, Smith even anticipated similar success with Jackson himself; 
believing ‘even Genl. Jackson’s firmness cannot resist’ public opinion and he ‘must 
yield to council.’178  
In casting the boycott as an act of moral censorship by the elite female 
community, the appearance of unanimity was central. Not only did it diminish 
individual culpability, but if only ladies aligned with Jackson’s political opponents 
participated, they risked perceptions of partisanship. The ostracism could then 
easily be construed as a political act, which would arouse latent fears of women 
wielding political power.  To avoid such an outcome, Smith littered her letters with 
examples of participants outside the ‘ladies of the opposition’ – such as the wives of 
‘two distinguished Jacksonian Senators, Hayne and Livingston... the Vice-
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President’s lady, the lady of the Secretary of the Treasury’ and the ‘females of the 
[President’s] family’ as well as ‘the Dutch minister’s family.’179 Moreover, Smith 
downplayed defections – only ‘two or three timid and rather insignificant 
personages, who trembled for their husband’s offices’ had visited Margaret – in 
order to portray the boycott as the ‘just and impartial’ resolution of ‘public 
opinion.’180  
To create such solidarity, elite women brought a variety of enforcement 
mechanisms to bear upon their peers. Of these, perhaps the least subtle was the 
anonymous letter sent to Susan Decatur, widow of a war hero, warning her against 
‘associating with Mrs. E.’181 Others were swayed by more indirect methods. The 
appearance of solidarity itself exerted significant pressure upon elite women to 
conform to the boycott. For instance, Eliza Johnston (a Senator’s wife) left 
Margaret’s visit unreturned – but not from any moral scruples. In fact, Johnston 
sympathised with her situation and wished to ‘spare the feelings of [Margaret] as 
long as possible.’ She criticised the boycott itself, lamenting that ‘women are the 
greatest persecutors of their own sex.’ Nevertheless, Johnston was ‘compelled’ by 
the ‘arbitrary dictates of the society here’ to join the ostracism, or risk her own social 
standing.182  
If Johnston had defied the decree of society, she could have suffered a 
similar fate to the McLane family. Prior to her husband’s appointment to the British 
ambassadorship, Catherine McLane made ‘violent asseverations’ against Margaret 
Eaton. The prospects of her husband’s political advancement, however, soon 
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changed her mind. On a return trip to Washington, Catherine ‘visited this lady, and 
instantly became a great favorite with the Pres’d.’ Though she stood to ‘gain great 
influence with [Jackson]’ from such a course, Smith predicted she would ‘lose 
proportionately in society.’183 Indeed, Calhoun scornfully remarked that her 
husband’s appointment as Treasury Secretary after the Cabinet dissolution had 
been ‘disgracefully purchased’ by this ‘subserviency to Mrs. Eaton.’184 The price was 
high; the McLanes were ostracised alongside Margaret Eaton. Sympathetic at first – 
‘poor woman... her new honors are not without thorns’ – Catherine’s ‘capricious 
ways’ led Smith to end her social intercourse with the McLanes, despite a close 
friendship of ten years.185 
To Jackson, morality had nothing to do with the boycott – it was a political 
act. Though he accurately discerned its political nature, the gendered lenses of the 
mass political culture which grounded his outlook produced an interpretation 
otherwise far from the mark. Apparently incapable of imagining women 
undertaking a political act of their own accord, Jackson perceived women as ‘either 
victims or ciphers of male manipulators’ throughout the scandal.186 
Correspondingly, he assumed that, as only men were political actors, both the 
ultimate perpetrator and target of the boycott were male. According to Jackson, the 
‘character of Mrs Eaton’ was slandered ‘so that a deep and lasting wrong might be 
inflicted on her husband.’187 Likewise, though Jackson oscillated between blaming 
Clay and Calhoun, the architect of the scandal was always assumed to be a (male) 
political adversary. Moreover, Jackson linked the behaviours of the target and the 
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perpetrator with his conceptions of ideal manhood and its converse: ‘the great 
contrast between virtue & vice, between the high Minded honourable man, & the 
base treacherous deceiver.’188  
Jackson’s response was also framed in terms of the honour code, which 
prescribed normative masculine behaviour. He was bound by two obligations to 
support the Eatons: aiding a friend in need and defending female character. In fact, 
Jackson’s bond with Eaton went beyond friendship and bordered upon quasi-
familial ties. An associate of almost two decades, Eaton was previously married to 
Jackson’s ward before her premature death.189 When they served together in the 
mid-1820s as Tennessee’s Senators, Jackson described him as ‘more than a son.’190 
Indeed, Van Buren remarked that no man ‘placed a higher value upon... the family 
circle’ than Jackson.191 Marszalek links Jackson’s reliance upon ‘devoted permanent 
friends’ to the loss of his family early in life and his lack of biological offspring.192 If 
Jackson did not support the Eatons, it was tantamount to adding ‘the weight and 
influence of [his] name’ to the rumours.193 To thus ‘abandon an old & tried friend’ 
would ‘disgrace’ Jackson’s honour.194 Even Smith conceded the rectitude of this 
rationale: ‘no one can deny the P.’s weakness originates in an amiable cause, – his 
devoted and ardent friendship for Genl. Eton.’195 
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The honour code also prescribed the ‘protection of the weak’ – meaning, in 
this case, the duty to ‘guard virtuous female character with vestal vigilance.’196  
Indeed, Jackson advised the adolescent Donelson years before that: ‘it is your duty 
to aid injured innocence when & wheresoever you meet with it’ having ensured 
‘that the subject of abuse is innocent, and the treatment unjust.’197 Margaret Eaton 
also recalled that ‘he seemed to feel... that every woman needed a defender.’198  
During the scandal Jackson believed he was not simply defending one 
female’s character, but defending female character in general. He interpreted the 
boycott as a recurrence of the ‘conspiracy against female character’ which had seen 
his late wife slandered during the 1828 presidential campaign.199 The successful 
ostracism of Margaret would sanction a system in which ‘the most innocent female, 
can be destroyed – on rumour’ alone.200 By late 1829, it is apparent that Jackson saw 
a wider significance to his stance. By disputing the boycott, Jackson challenged the 
‘divine right’ and ‘authority’ of the elite female community to ‘say who shall, & 
who shall not be permitted into society.’ Margaret’s acceptance had become the 
means to an end; a way to ‘put down’ the ‘system of gossipping & slander’ – a 
system through which, incidentally, his opponents maintained control of the social 
sphere of the capital.201 
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To accomplish this, Jackson embarked upon a multi-pronged strategy 
designed to rally the political elite behind his position and win Margaret social 
acceptance. He crafted and disseminated a competing narrative that subverted that 
of moral censorship, compiled evidence to disprove the rumours of Margaret’s 
immorality, and wielded threats of dismissal to bring his Cabinet and family into 
line. Concurrently, John Eaton traced these rumours in order to hold the gentlemen 
responsible to account through duelling.  
For Jackson’s crusade for Margaret’s social acceptance to appear legitimate 
he had to persuade the political elite that the boycott was, as he believed, a political 
act. This reconceptualisation transposed the boycott from the domestic to the 
political arena, which clearly fell within the scope of presidential authority. 
Jackson’s narrative, then, hinged upon revealing the ‘political purposes’ underlying 
Margaret’s ostracism in two ways.202 In early 1829, as he was repeatedly cautioned 
against Eaton’s inclusion in the Cabinet, Jackson framed the boycott as an improper 
female attempt to influence the selection of his Cabinet. He declared that he had not 
been elected ‘to consult the ladies of Washington as to the proper persons to 
compose my Cabinet’ or ‘to make a Cabinet for the fashionable ladies.’203 As the 
issue lingered long after the Cabinet had been determined Jackson changed tack. 
Instead of depicting the boycott as a female intrusion upon the masculine political 
domain, he interpreted it as a disguised conspiracy ultimately motivated by 
‘masculine malice.’204  
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As the scandal dragged on, Jackson elaborated upon this conspiracy 
narrative and substituted Clay for Calhoun as the villain of the piece. At the outset, 
the boycott was allegedly engineered by ‘Clay and his minions’ as well as ‘some of 
[Jackson’s political] friends from Tennessee’ who were ‘made the dupes to [these] 
designing enemies.’205 According to Jackson, this ‘wicked combination’ sought to 
‘intimidate me & to destroy... Eaton, & with him myself’ by circulating ‘the most 
unblushing, & unfounded slanders... against [Eaton’s] wife.’206  By 1830, Jackson 
had instead fixated upon Calhoun, whose wife was the first to refuse to return 
Margaret’s visit, as the ‘Great magician’ behind the ‘artifice.’207 In this version, 
Calhoun ‘dreaded the popularity of Eaton’ as an obstacle to his presidential 
aspirations, thus seeking ‘to put Major Eaton out of the Cabinet.’208 Moreover, this 
was only Calhoun’s latest ‘stab... in the dark’ directed at Jackson under the 
‘hypocritical garb of friendship.’209 Establishing a pattern of such behaviour on 
Calhoun’s part lent credibility to his narrative.  Therefore, Jackson provoked the 
Seminole Controversy with Calhoun: contending that the then-Secretary of War had 
secretly sabotaged Jackson by his opposition to Jackson’s 1818 invasion of Florida.210  
To further subvert the narrative of moral censorship, Jackson undermined 
the ostensible moral basis of the boycott by gathering and disseminating ‘evidence 
                                                          
205
 Andrew Jackson to Ralph Eleazar Whitesides Earl, March 16
th
 1829, in Feller (ed.), Papers of 
Andrew Jackson 1829, p. 98; Andrew Jackson to John Coffee, March 19
th
 1829, in Feller (ed.), Papers 
of Andrew Jackson 1829, p. 104; Andrew Jackson to John Coffee, March 22
nd
 1829, in Feller (ed.), 
Papers of Andrew Jackson 1829, p. 109. 
206
 Andrew Jackson to [John C. McLemore], September [14
th
] 1829, in Feller (ed.), Papers of Andrew 
Jackson 1829, p. 429; Andrew Jackson to John Coffee, May 30
th
 1829, in Feller (ed.), Papers of 
Andrew Jackson 1829, p. 249. 
207
 Andrew Jackson to John Coffee, March 19
th
 1829, in Feller (ed.), Papers of Andrew Jackson 1829, 
pp. 104-5; Andrew Jackson to William Berkeley Lewis, July 28
th
 1830, in Feller (ed.), Papers of 
Andrew Jackson 1830, p. 455. 
208
 Andrew Jackson to John C. McLemore, December 25
th
 1830, in Feller (ed.), Papers of Andrew 
Jackson 1830, p. 711. 
209
 Andrew Jackson to Mary Ann Eastin, October 24
th
 1830, in Feller (ed.), Papers of Andrew Jackson 
1830, p. 579. 
210
 Andrew Jackson to John Coffee, December 28
th
 1830, in Feller (ed.), Papers of Andrew Jackson 
1830, p. 719. 
53 | P a g e  
  
of [Margaret’s] innocence.’211 His investigations produced a 93-page manuscript 
which constituted an ‘account of the refutation of the various slanders.’  It contained 
testimonials ‘certifying [her] virtuous conduct’ and ‘attest[ing] to Mrs. Eaton’s 
purity’ as well as statements disproving particular rumours and records of relevant 
correspondence.212 Copies were circulated in (at least) Washington, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania and Tennessee by Jackson via political supporters.213 Jackson imposed 
no ‘injunction of secrecy on its contents’ and told one recipient ‘they may be shewn 
to any one’ he deemed proper, while emphasising they were ‘not intended for the 
press.’214  Evidently, they were targeted to an audience of political elites rather than 
the wider public. This inference is lent credence by the letters accompanying the 
copies, many of which openly addressed such an audience. One letter to John 
McLemore specifically addressed ‘my friends in Tennessee.’215 As his political base, 
Tennessee was a particular priority for Jackson. Moreover, Tennessee’s 
congressmen had been among the first to speak against Eaton’s appointment.216 
Jackson’s concern only increased when, upon an 1830 visit to the state, Margaret 
was excluded from Nashville society – ‘the combination of Washington [has] 
extended itself here... in Nashville.’217 
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Jackson’s efforts did not rest solely upon persuasion; he also exerted his 
executive authority to wield threats of dismissal against refractory Cabinet 
Secretaries, the Donelsons (in their roles as White House hostess and private 
secretary) and even the Dutch ambassador, Chevalier Huygens. Emphasising the 
importance of ‘harmony’ between members of his Cabinet, on more than one 
occasion Jackson intimated his willingness to ‘retire... the Gentlemen of my cabinet 
who cannot harmonise with Majr Eaton.’218 He made this explicit in January 1830, 
dispatching an intermediary (Congressman Richard M. Johnson) to pressure 
Ingham, Branch and Berrien into abandoning the boycott through threats of 
dismissal.219 Likewise, Jackson threatened to have Huygens recalled after word 
spread of his wife’s plans to head a ‘combination... to put Major Eaton and his 
family out of society’ after a perceived slight.220 Though he failed to follow through 
on these threats, he acted in the case of the Donelsons. After their 1830 visit to 
Tennessee, Emily was left behind, and in 1831 Andrew was replaced as private 
secretary by Nicolas P. Trist and joined her in exile.221  
Sharing Jackson’s outlook, John Eaton’s response to his wife’s ostracism was 
similarly shaped by a conception of the political arena as masculine and the 
precepts of honour. Throughout the scandal, Eaton sought to ‘trace... the slander[s] 
to a responsible source’ and deliver a suitable ‘chastisement’ for their ‘base 
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conduct.222 Such “chastisement” was a euphemism for a duel; the final recourse of 
the honour code by which fellow gentlemen could be held accountable. Though 
none of his challenges ever reached the duelling grounds, they served to silence 
gossips. Perceiving women as dupes or victims, Eaton ‘took the stand to make 
husbands answerable for the sayings of their wives.’223 Likewise, Eaton and Jackson 
excluded Margaret from strategy sessions over the scandal: Eaton insisted that she 
‘leave the whole matter to me... I can fight your battles and my own’ as it was ‘his 
business to defend’ her.224 When Margaret once broached the topic with Jackson, he 
instructed her to return to her domestic role: ‘go home and cook your bacon and 
greens and eat your dinner in peace.’225 So effective was this sidelining that she only 
learned of the worst slanders when interviewed decades afterwards.226  
As these narratives of moral censorship versus political conspiracy clashed, 
various figures had to navigate this treacherous political terrain. Jacksonians were 
placed in a particularly precarious position; forced to balance the competing 
demands made upon them by Washington society and the President. The unusual 
political landscape thus created opportunities and dangers for all involved; some 
careers and ambitions would be advanced while others would be stymied by the 
scandal. Figures such as Postmaster-General Barry, the Donelsons, Calhoun and 
Van Buren exploited the narratives of moral censorship and political conspiracy to 
legitimate their own positions towards Margaret Eaton as well as further their own 
agendas. 
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Barry took the opportunity to sharpen a familiar line of attack against 
Jackson’s opponents by casting the boycott as the social snobbery of would-be 
aristocrats. According to Barry, the ‘truth is, there is an aristocracy here... claiming 
preference for birth or wealth.’ The social elevation of Margaret, a tavern-keeper’s 
daughter, into the ‘fashionable world... [had] touched the pride of the self-
constituted great.’227 This narrative proved popular among many pro-Eaton 
Jacksonians. For those who agreed with Jackson that the ‘moralistic language’ of the 
Washington ladies masked ulterior motives, but disagreed these motives were 
political, ‘simple elitism’ was an apt explanation.228  
For the Donelsons, the boycott proved an intractable dilemma. Their 
presence and positions in Washington were due entirely to Jackson, but these were 
meaningless if they sacrificed their social standing by socialising with the Eatons ‘to 
please Uncle.’229 Attempting to adapt to the elite political culture without alienating 
Jackson, the Donelsons sought to stake out a neutral position in the social dispute 
by engaging in ‘partial intercourse’ with the Eatons.230 Emily paid Margaret an 
initial visit, but thereafter limited their social intercourse to official occasions.231 
Meanwhile, Andrew took ‘special pains’ to inform the ‘respectable Gentlemen of 
the city’ that they ‘had nothing to do with the question of Mrs. Eaton’s character.’232  
Framing their lack of intimacy with the Eatons in the most positive light, the 
Donelsons maintained their position was neither an endorsement of the rumours 
nor a judgement upon Margaret’s character. Emily assured John Eaton that she did 
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‘not wish to decide upon any person’s character here’ and Andrew held that, as a 
newcomer, the justice of the boycott was ‘not a question for me to decide.’233 Rather, 
they simply deferred to the ‘public mind’ which was ‘reluctant to accord to Mrs 
Eaton that respect which is usually paid to virtue.’234 This was a frequent refrain of 
Jacksonians caught in the same bind. Berrien, for instance, concluded it was 
unnecessary ‘to decide upon the truth or falsehood’ of the rumours. It was 
‘sufficient to ascertain the general sense of the community [and]... conform to it.’235 
Likewise, Floride Calhoun deferred to ‘the ladies who resided in this place, and 
who had the best means of forming a correct opinion of her conduct.’236 This 
rationale rendered futile Jackson’s efforts to gather evidence ‘by which truth or 
falsehood could be tested.’237 Like Caesar’s wife, Margaret Eaton should be above 
suspicion. 
This position was untenable for the Donelsons, as Jackson’s interpretation of 
the boycott left no room for equivocation. To Jackson, it was more than a mere 
difference of opinion. It represented a rejection of the paternal role that Jackson had 
stood in relation to Andrew since childhood. By failing to heed Jackson’s advice 
over the counsel of strangers, Andrew rejected Jackson’s role as ‘head of the 
family... [and] House hold.’238 Moreover, their stance undermined his efforts. If 
Jackson was unable to ‘govern [his own] Houshold’ how could he expect to succeed 
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with Washington society.239 Weaving the Donelsons into his narrative of conspiracy, 
Jackson came to believe them the ‘unwitting instruments, & tools’ of Calhoun’s 
intrigue.240 As such, he ultimately banished them to Tennessee. Until the Cabinet 
dissolution, however, the Donelsons remained subject to the conflicting imperatives 
of Washington society and Jackson’s will. While Jackson issued ultimatums for their 
return to the capital – ‘unless you and yours can harmonize with Major Eaton and 
his family I do not wish you here’ – the Washington ladies praised their ‘stand’ and 
advised them not to ‘yield one inch of ground.’241  
Just as the Eaton Affair divided Jackson from his family, it resulted in a 
rupture with his Vice-President, Calhoun, which would prove ruinous to the 
presidential hopes of the latter. At the outset of the Jackson Administration, 
Calhoun’s eventual accession seemed assured. He was widely viewed as the heir-
apparent given Jackson’s ill health and plans for a one-term presidency.242 As a 
long-time insider to Washington politics, beginning with a congressional stint in the 
1810s before serving as Secretary of War under Monroe and Vice-President under 
Adams and then Jackson, Calhoun was well versed in the usages of elite society. As 
such, when his wife ‘made up her mind not to return [Margaret’s] visit’ Calhoun 
naturally deferred to the ‘censorship which the [female] sex exercises over itself.’243 
Shortly after the inauguration, he departed for South Carolina with his wife, 
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returning only during the congressional sessions.244 In fact, Calhoun was absent 
from Washington during most of the scandal.  
His absence and inaction, however, did not prevent his alienation from 
Jackson, upon whom his presidential ambitions rested. Given Floride’s role as a 
society leader and the highest-ranked woman associated with the Jackson 
Administration, the Calhouns ‘unfairly came to be seen as the leaders of society’s 
opposition to Margaret.’245 When Floride failed to return to the capital with her 
husband, her absence was construed as a further snub: rather than ‘endure the 
contamination of Mrs. Eaton’s company she would not come to Washington.’246 
Meanwhile, Calhoun remained ‘mystified’ as to how this ‘purely social event’ had 
become a ‘political imbroglio’ into which he was entangled.247 According to Adams, 
‘Calhoun appeared to be exceedingly at a loss [over] what to do’ while Green 
castigated him for his ‘inaction.’248 The only decisive action he undertook was in 
response to the Seminole Controversy, which Jackson had provoked in order to cast 
Calhoun as a chronic conspirator. 
In February 1831, Calhoun published a dossier of correspondence on the 
subject intended to 'prove he was not hostile to the President’ by exposing ‘the plot 
to destroy my political standing’ to the public.249 Green also printed it in the 
Telegraph in the hopes that the ‘eyes of the President would be opened.’250 However, 
this backfired spectacularly. In order to ensure that their manoeuvre mollified 
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Jackson, Green had submitted the manuscript to Eaton prior to publication to obtain 
Jackson’s approval.251  Eaton, who had nursed ‘a grudge against Calhoun ever since 
Mrs. Calhoun’s refusal to associate with Mrs. Eaton,’ betrayed them by withholding 
it from the President.252 Jackson reacted furiously to the unauthorised publication: 
‘They have cut their own throats.’253 The Calhoun-Jackson breach was publicised 
rather than mended, triggering ‘daily hostilities’ between the pro-Calhoun Telegraph 
and pro-Jackson Globe which were echoed by their ancillary presses nationwide.254  
The greatest beneficiary of the Calhoun-Jackson split was Martin Van Buren, 
Jackson’s Secretary of State. As a member of Jackson’s Cabinet, Van Buren was 
caught between the conflicting demands made upon him by Jackson and 
Washington society in regards to the Eaton controversy. The Secretary of State was 
no outsider to the ways of Washington; he had served in the Senate through the 
1820s and was renowned for his social graces. Nevertheless, Van Buren took the 
part of the Eatons with zeal: commiserating with Jackson, inviting Margaret to 
parties, and even encouraging Emily Donelson (in vain) to abandon the boycott.255 
So fervent were his efforts that Smith and her cohorts considered including Van 
Buren in the ostracism.256 Despite hazarding his own social standing, Van Buren 
received ample recompense for his pains. His strong support for Margaret Eaton 
won him Jackson’s gratitude and confidence. By the end of 1829, Van Buren was 
Jackson’s preferred successor.257  
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Throughout the scandal, the anti-Eaton faction interpreted Jackson’s course 
in light of the expectations and perceptions of the capital’s elite political culture. 
Accustomed to the covert power elite women could wield in Washington, many 
came to believe the hidden hand of Margaret Eaton lay behind the President’s 
unwavering support for the Eatons. Ironically, this inverted Jackson’s similarly 
erroneous belief that a male politician lay behind the boycott. Latent fears of female 
power were roused as early as April 1829, when Green feared ‘much mischief from 
the furious passions of his revengeful wife operating on Eaton.’ Virgil Maxcy, a 
Calhoun partisan appointed Solicitor of the Treasury, concurred. Evoking 
Themistocles, Maxcy expressed the ‘melancholy conviction’ that ‘the U.S. are 
governed by the Pres[iden]t – the Pres[iden]t by the Sec[retar]y of War - & the latter 
by his W[ife].’258 One correspondent of Henry Clay detailed her methods: ‘Mrs 
Eaton I am told flatters up the old General in great stile and it runs down even to 
the hem of his garment like oil.’259  
Suspicions of Margaret’s malign influence were confirmed by the pattern of 
winners and losers in the Cabinet dissolution. Van Buren was appointed to the 
British ambassadorship, Eaton was expected to retake his former Senate seat, and 
Barry (ostensibly not part of the Cabinet proper) remained Postmaster-General.260 
No such executive favour was forthcoming for Ingham, Branch and Berrien who 
had all participated in the boycott. After the dismissal, Smith concluded that the 
President was ‘completely under the government of Mrs. Eaton.’261 Jackson angrily 
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reported that Calhoun was ‘secretely saying that mrs. Eaton is the President.’262 
Margaret herself acknowledged the common belief that she ‘had the ear of the 
President and could influence appointments as I chose.’263 Even Barry’s son 
believed ‘she did possess too much influence on the Sec[retar]y.’264 Smith then 
captured the sentiments of the Washington community when she spoke of the 
‘dissolution of the cabinet’ as the ‘triumph’ of Margaret Eaton.265 
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Fig. 2: This satire upon the dissolution of Jackson’s Cabinet 
delighted John Quincy Adams, who recorded that two 
thousand copies of the caricature were sold in a single day.266 
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Chapter 2: Malign Influence or Injured Innocence? 
The dissolution of Jackson’s Cabinet marked the culmination of one scandal 
and the beginning of a second. In this second phase, ‘the protagonists were no 
longer people, but papers’ which competed to define the meaning and motivation 
of the Cabinet dissolution before an audience of the wider public.267 Like the first 
scandal, the newspaper war became entangled with the presidential succession. 
Indeed, Duff Green deliberately provoked the scandal as a vehicle for Calhoun’s 
presidential ambitions. The ultimate failure of this ploy to resurrect Calhoun’s 
candidacy explains the lack of interest displayed by scholars in this second phase 
relative to the first scandal.  
The United States Telegraph and the Washington Globe were only the foremost 
papers in a press controversy that spanned the land.268 However, their insider 
knowledge of the Administration and location in the capital meant that they would 
set the terms of this contest. The Globe was established in December 1830 by Amos 
Kendall and Francis Blair on Jackson’s behalf, ostensibly as a friendly supplement to 
the Telegraph. Green was not taken in for an instant.269  Their rivalry became open 
when the publication of the Seminole Correspondence in February 1831 by Calhoun 
led the Globe to criticise the Vice-President and the Telegraph to defend him.270 Their 
‘small and peevish war’ attained a new dimension after the Cabinet dismissal.271 To 
advance Calhoun’s prospects by discrediting the Jackson Administration, Green 
seized upon the dissolution to portray the inner workings of the executive branch as 
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dangerously reminiscent of the court politics of European monarchies. Central to 
this portrayal would be tracing the Cabinet dissensions and dissolution to ‘the 
private pique of a vain & indiscreet woman’ – Margaret Eaton.272 In response, Blair 
attempted to turn the scandal back upon Green. Shifting the focus of controversy to 
the propriety of his revelations, Blair argued Green had dragged an innocent female 
into the political arena for partisan purposes. 
The prime mover behind the Cabinet dissolution in April 1831 was Martin 
Van Buren. Though Jackson had often threatened or intimated the possibility of 
dismissing the refractory Secretaries, he had failed to follow through. Once the 
breach between Calhoun and Jackson became public in February 1831, Van Buren’s 
position as Jackson’s preferred successor was assured. The Secretary of State could 
gain nothing more from the Eaton controversy, which had hamstrung the 
Administration for two years and had no end in sight. Therefore, Van Buren 
adroitly engineered the Cabinet dismissal. Approaching Jackson on one of their 
frequent horse rides around the countryside, Van Buren proffered his resignation, 
in the hopes that the rest of the Cabinet would follow suit. By appointing a new 
Cabinet, Jackson could finish his term free from the disruption of the Eaton 
controversy.273 Eaton and Barry co-operated, but Branch, Berrien and Ingham 
proved reluctant to volunteer their resignations. Jackson then officially requested 
their resignations, on the grounds that the Cabinet had ‘come in... as a unit’ and 
should leave as such.’274  
Jackson and Van Buren were well aware of the attention that the 
unprecedented event would attract from the press and public, thus far kept in the 
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dark over the Cabinet dissensions.275 If it became public knowledge that the 
ultimate cause was a woman scorned, comparisons with the corrupt courts of 
Europe would ensue and the Administration suffer incalculable damage.  With 
uncanny prescience, Van Buren warned Jackson of the risk of being ‘drawn into a 
newspaper controversy’ over the issue.276 To forestall this outcome, they embarked 
on a strategy of obfuscation: contriving to place the resignations, according to the 
report of the British ambassador, ‘upon ground[s] separate from those which, it is 
well known, have really brought about the dissolution of the Cabinet.’277 Officially, 
Eaton attributed his departure to a long-held plan to retire once the Administration 
had been placed on a favourable footing, while Van Buren sought to avoid a 
‘premature agitation of the question of your Successor’ by his withdrawal.278 
Branch, Berrien and Ingham proffered no explanations, presenting their 
resignations as simply acts of ‘obedience to [Jackson’s] will.’279 At first, Van Buren 
believed this obfuscation had succeeded. To all appearances, the Cabinet 
dissolution was ‘amicably accomplished.’ Yet before long it would assume a ‘very 
violent character.’280 
 Lacking any precedent in American political history, the Cabinet dissolution 
‘stunned the nation.’281 Visiting Philadelphia when the news struck, Adams found 
‘scarcely any other topic of conversation than the recent breaking up of the 
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President’s Cabinet at Washington.’282 This shock was accompanied by fears for the 
future – did the extraordinary event herald a constitutional crisis or collapse of 
government?283 These fears were best exemplified in the rumours overtaking 
Spanish Cuba.  News of the dissolution combined with the sighting of a schooner 
flying a state (rather than national) flag led to reports that the Union had been 
dissolved altogether.284 The passage of time soon quelled anxieties over a wider 
political upheaval, and the press redirected its scrutiny towards satisfying ‘the 
intense curiosity which prevails to ascertain the causes which produced the 
breaking up of the late cabinet.’285 The official resignation correspondence between 
the President and his Secretaries only stoked the public clamour for answers. These 
letters were widely condemned for their ambiguity. The Charleston Mercury 
described Van Buren’s letter (the longest) ‘as mysterious and incomprehensible as a 
Sibylline oracle.’286 Meanwhile, the Lynchburg Jeffersonian labelled it an attempt ‘to 
throw dust in the eyes of an enlightened people.’287 The Wisconsin Republican 
concluded that the public, kept in the dark, would be ‘left to conjecture’ the causes 
of the Cabinet’s breakup.288 
 The curiosity of the public over the dissolution presented Green, with his 
insider knowledge and the platform of the Telegraph, with another opportunity to 
promote Calhoun’s presidential candidacy. Outmanoeuvred in the elite arena by 
Van Buren, a change of tactics was necessary. Instead of seeking Jackson’s 
endorsement, they sought to strengthen Calhoun’s ‘attachment... to the great body 
of the party’ in order to realise his presidential ambitions through grassroots 
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support.289 By exposing the role female influence (i.e. Margaret Eaton) played in 
orchestrating the Cabinet dismissal to this targeted demographic, Green sought to 
discredit the Administration. Consequently, Calhoun’s estrangement from the 
President would become a virtue. Sincerely believing that Margaret Eaton wielded a 
malign influence over Jackson, Green believed that once the President’s use of 
‘power and patronage to sustain Mrs. Eaton’ was ‘made manifest to the American 
people’ the reaction against him would be stronger... than it was against his 
predecessor.’290  
 Newspapers were the most influential political medium because, as 
Tocqueville observed in 1831, they were the only means to ‘put the same thought at 
the same time before a thousand readers.’291 Given their role in mediating between 
the political leadership and their constituents in the incipient democratic political 
culture of the masses, newspaper historian Jeffrey Pasley contends that ‘the 
newspaper press was the political system’s central institution.’292 Newspapers, 
according to media historian Gerald Baldasty, provided the ‘foundation for a 
national political network’ which united the geographically dispersed and 
predominantly rural population into the American polity.293 Congress recognised 
and buttressed this role through a series of institutional incentives. In a ‘disguised 
government subsidy’ the price of newspaper postage was set below the actual cost, 
and editors could exchange copies of their newspapers with each other for free.294 
Such measures assisted circulation tremendously. In 1830, with a nationwide 
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population of roughly thirteen million (of which five million, children aside, 
comprised the electorate of free, white males), there were over sixteen million 
newspapers circulated via the postal service. By 1832, newspapers comprised 95% 
of all mail delivered by weight.295  
 Most newspapers were unabashedly partisan; their goal to persuade rather 
than inform. They did not attempt even a pretence of objectivity. In fact, their 
partisanship was regarded as a positive good, whereas stances of neutrality were 
met with suspicion. Green’s Telegraph had ‘no faith in these professions of strict 
neutrality.’296 A second Jacksonian editor agreed: ‘we most of all things abhor and 
detest... a neutral newspaper’ as pretending ‘to be all things to all men.’ The editor 
of such a newspaper either lacked political principles or was ‘doing violence to his 
opinions’ in the opportunistic pursuit of personal gain.297 Just as print-capitalism, 
according to Benedict Anderson, constructed an ‘imagined community’ that 
underpinned the emergence of national identity in the early republic, so too did this 
system of ‘newspaper politics’ foster partisan identity among its readers.298 
Tocqueville observed this occurrence firsthand, noting that newspapers ‘brought... 
together’ and constructed ‘an association that is composed of its habitual readers.’299  
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The partisan nature of the press meant that typical editors ‘did much more 
than edit newspapers.’300 Observing the rivalry of Van Buren and Calhoun play out 
in the pages of the Telegraph and Globe, Adams dryly remarked that ‘in our 
Presidential canvassing an editor has become as essential an appendage to a 
candidate as in the days of chivalry a squire was to a knight.’301 The role of the press 
as intermediary between politicians and the public meant that editors were 
perfectly positioned to ‘shape public opinion on a massive scale’ to further partisan 
purposes.302 Tocqueville noted that the ‘power of the periodical press’ was 
immense, but ‘each separate journal exercises but little authority’ – and, indeed, 
their influence varied.303  
In light of the tyranny of distance, the Washington press possessed 
disproportionate sway due to their proximity to the centre of political power. They 
held an ‘established monopoly’ over the political news of the capital and acted as 
‘conduits to news outlets throughout the nation’ with their articles reprinted 
extensively. The ‘incestuous’ relationship between Washington newspapers and the 
political elite was even institutionalised in 1835, when the Senate restricted access to 
the floor to journalists from Washington publications.304 Moreover, the United States 
Telegraph had been the ‘national flagship’ of the Jacksonian coalition for five years, 
directing ancillary newspapers during Jackson’s 1828 campaign.305 Despite the 
encroachments of the Globe, Duff Green still wielded a far greater influence over 
national political discourse than any run-of-the-mill editor. On Calhoun’s behalf 
Green deployed this influence to apply the strategy they had earlier attempted with 
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the Seminole Controversy to the Eaton scandal: utilising the ‘press [to] direct the 
publick indignation against the continuance of this profligate intrigue.’306 
Calhoun’s resort to the court of public opinion represented a retreat from his 
earlier ideals of republican rule and an accommodation with the emerging 
democratic political culture. Less than fifteen years earlier Calhoun had scorned the 
idea that Congress should be bound by voter preferences. Addressing the House of 
Representatives he had asked rhetorically, ‘Have the people of this country 
snatched the power of deliberation from this body?' Instead, Calhoun had evoked 
the ‘celebrated speech’ of Edmund Burke to elaborate a theory of representation in 
which the role of the public was simply to hold their representatives ‘responsible... 
for the faithful discharge of their duties’ rather than instruct them in their 
deliberations.  Furthermore, Calhoun judged the public incompetent to elect the 
President directly, celebrating that ‘his election is... removed... three degrees from 
the people’ via the Electoral College and state legislatures.307 In such a setting, 
Green’s attempts to win Calhoun the presidency through producing a groundswell 
of popular support would have been unimaginable. 
Since 1817, however, public opinion had become central to the political 
process. It was ‘obsessively’ discussed by Americans, who believed the ‘statistical 
collectivity’ of informed political opinions equated to the ‘general will’ of the 
people. The general will, rather than the deliberations of a virtuous republican elite, 
could best determine the common good.308 In this reinterpretation of the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, public opinion became the chief source of political legitimacy. 
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This was put into practice via reforms: the expansion of suffrage and widespread 
institution of popular presidential voting.309 Popular opinion was particularly 
valued by Jacksonians, Green’s primary audience, who had framed the 1828 
campaign against Adams as the struggle of democracy against aristocracy. Yet, 
beyond election results, the political system lacked any reliable or scientific means 
to measure public opinion. Consequently, newspapers assumed this role, casting 
themselves as the mechanism through which public opinion could be articulated on 
a daily basis.310 This role enabled editors, like Green, to represent popular opinion 
in a certain light to further shape it to their own ends.  
Seeking to sustain and intensify the public discontent with the official 
reasons for the Cabinet dissolution, Green did exactly this. As a result, when he 
eventually exposed the role of Margaret Eaton he could legitimise it as a response to 
overwhelming public demand. He achieved this by selectively reprinting editorials 
from like-minded newspapers (in the absence of copyright or licensing laws this 
could be done without limit or attribution) and letters to the editor.311 Issue after 
issue, the Telegraph published content encompassing the geography of the republic. 
The Pennsylvania Reporter complained that ‘the whole of the Cabinet have been 
disbanded for reasons... unknown to us.’312 A subscriber from North Carolina 
condemned the ‘mystery about the matter’ and branded the official reasons as 
cryptic as ‘a response from the Delphic Oracle.’313 Less subtly, Green simply 
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reported public opinion in accord with his own ends: 'The sum of public opinion is 
– that the government has been disgraced and the nation outraged.'314 
Green further stirred up public interest by hinting at the actual cause. 
Though he withheld the specifics, the Telegraph intimated that the ‘re-organisation 
of the cabinet’ was rooted in a private affair, as it bore ‘no relation to the public 
duties.’315 This assertion was lent credence by the official resignation letters, in 
which Jackson praised the ‘ability... zeal’ and ‘efficiency’ of the dismissed 
Secretaries in the performance of their duties.316 Acting as an outlet for the anti-
Eaton Secretaries, Green published a public statement by Ingham which held that 
the ‘official intercourse of the Heads of Departments... had never... been interrupted 
for a moment.’317 Instead, Green opined, the cause was to be found in a ‘want of 
harmony... applying to the social, and not the official, relations of the late 
incumbents.’318 This was elaborated upon by Branch, who attributed the ‘want of 
harmony’ to the work of malign influences’ in the Administration.319  As Green 
excited the public clamour to fever pitch, he simultaneously sought to defuse any 
backlash from his forthcoming revelations. 
Green’s reticence also stemmed from a second imperative: the informal 
prohibition upon discussing women openly in the press.320 Indeed, his restraint only 
extended to the medium of the press; Green displayed no such caution over 
                                                          
314
 United States Telegraph, July 11 1831. 
315
 United States Telegraph, May 27 1831. 
316
 Andrew Jackson to Samuel D. Ingham, April 20
th
 1831, in Bassett (ed.), Correspondence, p. 268; 
Andrew Jackson to John Berrien, June [15
th
] 1831, in United States Telegraph, June 23 1831. 
317
 United States Telegraph, May 27 1831; Pollack, Democracy’s Mistress, p. 144. 
318
 United States Telegraph, May 17 1831 
319
 United States Telegraph, May 27 1831. 
320
 Allgor, Parlor Politics, p. 218; Pollack, Democracy’s Mistress, p. 137; Pigott, “Emily Donelson”, p. 
35. 
74 | P a g e  
  
disseminating his narrative of malign influence via letters.321  Editors were 
customarily reluctant to discuss women in print. The newspaper, after all, 
embodied the masculine realm of commerce and politics – a world in which women 
had no place. This cohered with the ‘emerging ideal of domestic privacy’ and the 
common conviction that women were domestic (not political) beings.322 Ironically, 
Green himself risked censure for collapsing public-private boundaries by exposing 
the monarchic mingling of public and private spheres manifest in a woman’s role in 
undoing the Cabinet.323 His fears of backlash were well-founded. The National 
Intelligencer would accuse him of ‘drag[ing] a woman through the political Arena’ 
while Rebecca Gratz professed herself ‘offended at seeing Mrs Eatons name in every 
print’ and the ‘decencies of domestic life... [so] violated.’324 To ensure the subject of 
controversy would remain the court-like politics of the Administration rather than 
the propriety of his revelations, Green pre-emptively countered these lines of attack. 
Though conceding that ‘domestic concerns’ were usually deemed ‘improper 
[subjects] for newspaper discussion,’ Green argued the Eaton Affair was an 
exception to the rule.325 As the ‘circumstances of 1829’ (his oblique shorthand for the 
Eaton scandal) were ‘made the basis of official action of the President’ they had ‘lost 
their private character.’326 As the cause of the Cabinet dissolution this affair ‘would 
form an important part of the future history of the Republic’ and hence was ‘no 
longer... private... it is public.’327 Moreover, Margaret Eaton had ‘unsexed’ herself by 
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abandoning the shield of domesticity to enter the public arena.328 Therefore, the 
public had ‘a right to know what these circumstances were’ that undid the Cabinet 
– an exigency which overrode the usual claims of confidentiality conceded to a 
domestic affair.329 The exposure of the Eaton controversy to the public, then, was 
more than permissible – it was a ‘public duty.’330 Green was doubly bound by his 
privileged knowledge and as an editor. It was ‘the duty of every individual to 
throw such light upon the subject as he may possess’ and, in addition, it was ‘the 
duty of the press to publish truth.’331  
The narrative of the Eaton scandal fashioned by Green for public 
consumption was carefully crafted to depict the Jackson Administration as the 
embodiment of European-style court politics, against which both republican and 
democratic governance were defined. The corruption of European governance 
resided in the breakdown of separate social and political spheres, and the 
coalescence of these private and public realms. Green demonstrated this occurrence 
in Jackson’s executive branch in three key ways: the secrecy surrounding the 
Cabinet dissolution, malign influences (chiefly Margaret Eaton) wielding covert 
power via intrigue, and the President’s tyrannical attempts to regulate the social 
intercourse of Washingtonians. The London Times aptly identified this portrayal as 
the source of the scandalised response of the American public. The Cabinet 
dissolution revealed that ‘our brethren west of the Atlantic are not exempted from 
the private influences in the management of their public affairs, which in their 
severer moods they ascribe exclusively to the old Courts of Europe.’332  
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The resemblances with European court politics resonated with the concerns 
of the ‘free, white males’ that constituted the Jacksonian electorate.333 In their 
political culture, America – the lone republic in a world populated by monarchies – 
was regarded as an exceptional nation, defined by its difference from the Old 
World. European precedent, then, was a constant source of comparison.334 The 
flipside of this exceptionalism was an abiding anxiety that the United States could 
succumb to the European example, relapsing into monarchy or tyranny. The 
traditional fate of classical republics, another key reference point, provided little 
reason for optimism.335 Green evoked these fundamental fears to funnel public 
outrage against the Administration. It was doubly damaging that such scandal 
should occur under Andrew Jackson, the self-proclaimed outsider and man of the 
people who had promised to ‘cleans[e]’ the ‘Great Augean Stable at Washington’ 
after the presidency of the aristocratic Adams.336  
Lacking a reference point in their own history and conscious of European 
precedent, typical first reactions to the dismissal drew parallels with Europe. Upon 
hearing the news, Calhoun described the dissolution as ‘European in all of its 
features.’337 The press followed suit, the Edgefield Carolinian noted that the ‘change of 
ministry’ undertaken by Jackson followed ‘examples... afforded by France and 
England.’338 The Telegraph also made the link, observing that while ‘each successive 
arrival from Europe brings notice of changes, either made or contemplated, in the 
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ministry of France and England... an entire change of Cabinet’ was hardly typical of 
the United States.339 Green simply had to build upon the initial impression of the 
public by reinforcing the parallels with European politics.  
The first parallel drawn by Green was between the secrecy and opaqueness 
of European governments and the mystery surrounding the ‘real motives’ 
underlying Jackson’s Cabinet breakup. According to the Telegraph, this 
‘unprecedented change in the government remains as inexplicable to the great body 
of the governed as if they were the serfs and vassals of an absolute power.' Instead 
of the transparency and openness expected of republican government, ‘darkness... 
envelopes the conduct of the Executive.'340 In such court-like atmospheres, in which 
power was treated as a personal prerogative rather than a public trust, intrigue and 
female influence could flourish beyond the scrutiny of the citizenry.341 Once Green 
himself disrupted this veil of secrecy, these additional features reminiscent of 
monarchies were laid bare. Rather than the ambiguous explanations provided by 
the Administration, it was ‘Mrs Eaton’s influence [that] dissolved the cabinet.’342 
Though such “malign influences” (a staple of Green’s editorials) were to be 
expected in European governments, they were anathema to the expectations of the 
electorate. 
In this context, “malign influence” was a loaded term which evoked a 
plethora of meanings for contemporary readers. As Joan Scott has observed, words 
themselves ‘have a history.’343 Their meanings fluctuate over time and cannot be 
appreciated independently of their milieu.  Carrying connotations of corruption, 
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‘influence’ referred to the ‘covert exercise of political power’ via extra-official 
means, often in defiance of the popular will.344 The involvement of women 
amplified anxiety by invoking fears that their ‘distinctive feminine charms’ could 
‘subvert the political process.’345 Thomas Jefferson, for instance, warned against the 
‘influence of women in the government’ based on his experiences in Revolutionary 
France. The ‘manners of the nation’ allowed French women to ‘visit, alone, all 
persons in office, to sollicit the affairs of the husband, family, or friends’ which had 
reduced the country to a ‘desperate state.’ However, Jefferson reassured himself 
that the American republic was safe from the ‘omnipotence’ of female influence, 
which was contained behind the ‘domestic line.’346  
In the case of Margaret Eaton, these anxieties were expressed via a 
vocabulary of malign female influence primarily informed by classical history and 
European precedent. Articulating fears surrounding the ‘illicit sexual power’ elite 
women could wield, the Roanoke Advocate branded Margaret a ‘modern Cleopatra’ 
while one reader facetiously enquired whether this ‘modern Helen [of Troy]’ was as 
fair as the original.347 The New York Daily Advertiser invoked two powerful 
courtesans who were mistresses of Louis XV, asking whether ‘the Administration 
had been ruled by a Madame Pompadour or Duchess duBarry?’348 One Telegraph 
subscriber drew upon biblical allusions, likening Margaret’s influence to the 
‘whispers of the serpent... in the garden of Eden.’349 For Green the use of this 
vocabulary served a secondary purpose. By referring to Margaret as ‘Bellona’ 
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(Roman goddess of war) Green both alluded to the illicit power she exerted through 
her husband, the Secretary of War, and evaded, to a degree, the prohibition upon 
discussing women in connexion with politics in the press.350  
Green’s final parallel with European monarchies centred upon Jackson’s 
efforts to ‘regulate the intercourse of female society.’351 Under the sway of Margaret 
Eaton, the President had sought to ‘compel’ the families of Ingham, Branch and 
Berrien to associate with that of Major Eaton’ under threat of dismissal.352 This 
represented a vast overreach of presidential power beyond the public sphere into 
the domestic realm, and smacked of tyranny. Moreover, Jackson was arrogating the 
role of women in regulating their families’ social intercourse. The Telegraph 
reprinted a Connecticut Herald editorial that accused Jackson of ‘attempting to 
engraft upon our government the worst features of absolute monarchy.'353 A letter 
to the editor reversed Jackson’s epithet of Calhoun as a traitorous Brutus – ‘Et tu 
Brute?’ – to argue that Brutus ‘was an honourable man’ while Jackson ‘assumes the 
character of Caesar... a tyrant.’354 Intriguing for power, Van Buren then ‘availed 
himself of this peculiar situation to ingratiate himself into the favor of the President 
by urging the propriety’ of his efforts to dictate social intercourse.355  
By emphasising the role of Van Buren and his cohorts, Green was able to 
separate the President... from the intrigues passing around him.’356 This language of 
intrigue originated from the republican vocabulary of the Revolutionary generation, 
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who had similarly used it to separate the king from his ministers.357 In Green’s 
portrayal, Van Buren headed a ‘secret cabal’ of ‘corrupt counsellors’ that virtually 
held the President hostage. They undertook ‘an organised plan of intercepting every 
thing which they believe will open his eyes to their practices.’358 Jackson, then, was 
the ‘victim of a faction, and the creature of a political intrigue.’359 The President, 
therefore, was ‘not so much to blame’ for the dire state of his Administration as ‘his 
selfish and wicked advisers.’360 This rendering of events certainly persuaded 
Margaret Bayard Smith, who, by August 1831, believed the President was an ‘old 
man... in his dotage’ unaware of ‘what he says or what he does.’361  
At first, Green may have had some small hope of discrediting Van Buren in 
Jackson’s eyes via this ploy and thereby positioning Calhoun as his successor. 
Indeed, as late as May 1831 the Telegraph noted its ‘regret’ over the ‘altercation 
which has taken place between the first and second officers of the Government’ and 
hoped ‘it may prove a temporary misunderstanding.’362 But more importantly, 
through this tactic Green countered accusations of disloyalty to Jackson and 
positioned himself (and Calhoun) as still within the party, which was a loose 
coalition primarily united by the figure of Jackson and his personal popularity. As 
Daniel Webster observed, however, Green and Calhoun faced ‘great difficulty’ in 
separating ‘opposition to Van Buren from opposition to the President.’363 
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Once Jackson made his personal opposition to the Telegraph clear, this 
proved an impossible balancing act to maintain. By July, Green had ‘no alternative 
left but to ascribe to him all that has taken place.’364 In any case, this only hastened 
their ultimate goal of placing Calhoun before the party as an alternative presidential 
candidate. The consequent opposition to Jackson’s re-election was grounded upon 
two key arguments: that Jackson’s popularity could not survive the backlash over 
his role in the Eaton controversy, and that this role demonstrated that he had 
‘trample[d] underfoot the principles upon which he was elected.’365 Conversely, the 
Telegraph refused to ‘desert the principles upon which it was established.’366 In 
short, Jackson, not Calhoun and Green, had left the party – a point driven home by 
signing off letters to the editor from ‘an original Jacksonian.’367 
Green made a virtue of this estrangement from the President. In contrast to 
the power-hungry intriguers, Green, Calhoun and the anti-Eaton Secretaries were 
motivated by considerations of the public good. They acted as Jackson’s ‘honorable, 
high-minded and independent friends’ by risking their own political preferment 
and self-interest to ‘dare tell him when and where he is wrong.’368 To an earlier 
generation of elites inculcated with the values of classical republicanism, Green’s act 
of self-sacrifice for the common good would have epitomised disinterested public 
virtue. Appealing to the emerging democratic political culture, Green instead cast 
himself as the exemplar of “manly independence.” Reflecting the premium placed 
upon public opinion as the chief source of political legitimacy, Green did not voice 
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this sentiment himself. Rather, the Telegraph published a surfeit of letters to the 
editor and public toasts praising its ‘recent course’ as ‘independent and patriotic’ 
and the ‘manly and independent stand... taken in favour of Mr. Calhoun’ by its 
editor.369 The emphasis upon independence should not be misconstrued in terms of 
modern journalistic objectivity. “Independence” was usually coupled with “manly” 
to identify Green’s behaviour with normative manhood while reinforcing the 
corrupt state of affairs under Jackson, where the public and private were hopelessly 
intermingled and women wielded power over men. 
As Green disseminated his narrative, the Administration and its 
mouthpiece, the Globe, were put on the defensive. With the strategy of obfuscation a 
failure, the Globe (previously published twice weekly) transitioned into a daily 
format in mid-June to counter the Telegraph with its own version of events.370 When 
this recourse failed to quell the scandal, John Eaton elaborated upon this narrative 
in a lengthy political pamphlet published in September 1831.  He made it clear that 
print was not his first choice: he preferred to defend his wife’s character and 
familial honour via personal redress (duelling). This was not simply lip service that 
enabled Eaton to claim the mantle of a muscular masculinity, though it certainly 
served that purpose. In fact, Eaton issued challenges to Ingham, Branch and Berrien 
during the newspaper war, but all shrunk ‘from an honourable and just 
accountability.’371 
Denied honourable redress, Eaton resorted to ridicule to rebut charges of his 
wife’s malign political influence. The idea that that a single woman was ‘so 
formidable in influence and power as to require’ an ‘array of Cabinet counsellors’ 
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and ‘fashionable ladies’ to contain her was ‘truly ridiculous.’ 372 Rather than 
interfering in public affairs until her exposure by the Telegraph, Margaret Eaton had 
been ‘dragged before the public’ by Green to ‘defame her reputation for political 
purpose.’373 Therefore, rather than embodying malign influence, Margaret was 
portrayed as the incarnation of injured female innocence. Her defenders 
accomplished this by invoking an antithetical imagery of womanhood. She was cast 
in the normative role of a dutiful wife and mother.  The New York Courier & Enquirer 
expressed outrage that ‘an American female... a wife and mother’ should be 
‘compared to a Pompadour or a DuBarry... the infamous courtesans of the time of 
Louis XIV and XV.’374 Likewise, Eaton reminded readers that his wife was first and 
foremost ‘a mother, with two innocent daughters.’375 
Far from a high-minded concern for the public good, then, the motives for 
which Green ‘invaded the sanctuary of domestic life’ were as base as the act itself.376 
Despite the vehement denials of the Telegraph, Eaton argued his true motives were 
the ‘political designs’ upon the presidency by Calhoun, of whom ‘Duff Green... has 
been from the first the instrument.’377  Green was not independent – simply the 
‘devoted, active partizan’ of the Vice-President.378 Nor was Green’s behaviour 
manly, by ‘calumniating female innocence’ for ‘political interests’ he had abrogated 
the role and duties of normative masculinity.379 In antebellum society, patriarchal 
power entailed paternal responsibilities, chiefly the protection of dependents such 
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as women.380  Inverting the role of ‘protector’ Green had engaged upon ‘wanton 
attacks on female character.’381 He had also failed to ‘act like a man’ by his ‘vague 
insinuations’ and ‘stab[s] in the dark.’382 Innuendo was a ‘womanly weapon,’ 
whereas a gentleman would openly stake his honour upon the truth of his 
statements.383  
As it was beneath the dignity of his office, Jackson could not overtly involve 
himself in the ‘editorial war’ over public opinion between the Telegraph and Globe.384 
He did, however, involve himself in the parallel struggle that raged beneath the 
surface over the allocation of resources to the respective newspapers. The primary 
sources of press revenue were political, particularly since subscribers often failed to 
pay and commercial advertising frequently originated from political supporters.385 
For Washington newspapers, government printing contracts constituted the chief 
form of political patronage, deriving from the executive departments and the 
position of official printer to each house of Congress.386 Playing it safe, the canny 
Green had waited until his successful re-election as printer to the Senate and the 
House for the 22nd Congress (1831-33) before publishing the Seminole 
Correspondence.387  
This proved a prudent precaution. Once the resultant editorial war broke 
out, Jackson undertook multiple measures to benefit the Globe’s financial base to the 
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detriment of the Telegraph. By executive order, the printing of the executive 
departments was diverted from the Telegraph to the Globe. Jackson also exerted 
‘wholly improper’ pressures upon federal office-holders, bluntly telling them ‘I 
expect you all to patronise the Globe.’388 Like visits to Margaret Eaton, subscriptions 
to the Globe became a ‘litmus test’ of loyalty to the President.389 This was not 
unprecedented; in the absence of official party memberships, newspaper 
subscriptions served as statements of political alignment.390 Moreover, additional 
funds were secretly (and illegally) funnelled to the Globe via the Post Office.391 These 
measures were successful, enabling the Globe to increase circulation from 2,000 
subscribers in July 1831 to 3,700 by November 1831, as well as providing sufficient 
resources for the Globe to transition into a daily newspaper.392 
 By trumpeting the implementation of these measures, Green turned them to 
his advantage and reinforced his parallels with European court politics. The 
methods by which ‘the Globe is sustained and the Telegraph assailed’ were 
presented as evidence of the clandestine intrigues with which the Jackson 
Administration was allegedly rife.393  As the executive departments withdrew their 
patronage one by one, Green published their cancellation letters accompanied by 
caustic commentary.394 Moreover, the ‘withdrawal of all the patronage of the 
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Departments was but the preliminary step’ in their ultimate purpose of ‘putting 
down the Telegraph.’395 Throughout the country, great efforts were made to ‘induce 
the friends of the Administration... to substitute the Globe for the Telegraph.’ 
Office-holders, too, ‘received pretty distinct intimations’ to transfer their support 
accordingly.396 Telegraph subscribers reported on such happenings in their own 
locales: observing ‘efforts... to lessen your subscription lists’ and to ‘persuade me to 
subscribe for the Globe.’397 In what were no doubt intended as salutary examples, 
such letters closed with a promise to ‘make amends by obtaining new subscribers’ 
and thus ‘balance... your withdrawals.’398  
These measures also afforded Green the opportunity to further characterise 
his course as independent and driven by concern for the common good, while 
reinforcing his portrayal of Jackson as a tyrant. Just as Jackson had sought to dictate 
the ‘the social intercourse of the citizens of Washington’ he now endeavoured to 
‘direct them in the choice of a new paper.’399 Defying this tyranny, Green refused to 
‘prostitute his press’ in the pursuit of ‘private interest.’400 While Blair’s Globe was 
chiefly ‘interested in the profits... given him by the public offices’ the Telegraph’s 
only interest was in ‘performing our public duty.’401  
Though Calhoun published a rejoinder to Eaton’s pamphlet in late October, 
the newspaper dispute had begun to peter out. Calhoun’s response reiterated 
Green’s themes, but ran to far fewer pages than Eaton’s pamphlet and received no 
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response in turn.402 The Vice-President, like the rest of the nation, was preoccupied 
with a more pressing issue: the looming crisis over South Carolina’s threat to nullify 
the federal tariff.403 Moreover, the open sore of the Eatons’ presence in Washington 
had disappeared with their departure to Tennessee in September. The Nullification 
Crisis would prove the final nail in the coffin for Calhoun’s presidential hopes; from 
then on his politics tended to the sectional. In 1832, Van Buren would take 
Calhoun’s former position upon Jackson’s ticket, and then succeed him to the 
presidency four years later. 
Though it was small consolation for Green, his narrative of malign influence 
won out over that of injured innocence and would characterise the popular memory 
of the Eaton Affair through the nineteenth century. The conspiratorial currents in 
American political culture, labelled the ‘paranoid style’ by Richard Hofstadter, 
predisposed the public towards accepting Green’s narrative.404 Marszalek observed 
that, even during the newspaper war itself, the bulk of press coverage surrounding 
Margaret Eaton comprised ‘allegations that she was immoral and... dominated the 
Jackson administration.’405 By 1860, Parton observed that ‘Van Buren has long 
rested under the imputation of having precipitated this quarrel for purposes of his 
own.’406 In 1873, Wigfall even duplicated Green’s phraseology to speak of Calhoun’s 
stand as an ‘act of manly independence.’407 Likewise, late nineteenth-century 
newspapers which revisited the scandal restated Green’s version of events. In 1876, 
the St. Louis Globe-Democrat spoke of the ‘Queen of society’ who held Jackson 
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‘utterly in her power’ and thus ‘virtually became chief officer of the republic.’408 
Three years earlier the Daily Evening Bulletin had labelled her ‘The Woman Who 
Ruled at the White House' and ‘once held the destinies of a nation in her hand’ 
while in 1896 the Chicago Tribune retold the stories of how she 'had broken up the 
Cabinet of the nation, and made and marred the fortunes of the statesmen of the 
young republic.'409   
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Conclusion 
 On December 3rd 1861, the famed British war correspondent William 
Howard Russell dined with Simon Cameron, Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary of War. 
Cameron entertained those present with tales of Washington’s political gossip from 
his younger days. The only anecdote Russell considered worth recording was the 
scandal surrounding Margaret Eaton under Jackson’s presidency. In words that 
could have been Green’s own, Cameron spoke of Margaret as a ‘beautiful, [b]old 
and witty... publican’s daughter’ who rose to become a ‘leading personage in the 
State’ and ‘ruled the imperious, rugged old Andrew Jackson so completely that he 
broke up his Cabinet and dismissed his ministers on her account.’410  
 Though the Eaton Affair remained present in popular memory even in the 
midst of the Civil War, twentieth-century historians dismissed it as inconsequential. 
Taking scandal seriously, however, it becomes evident that the Eaton Affair was just 
as significant as the nineteenth-century believed, though they lacked the analytic 
vocabulary to fully express its import. There were, in fact, two distinct controversies 
occurring in sequence; in the elite arena of Washington politics and the wider public 
sphere respectively. The gendered narratives disseminated to address these distinct, 
yet overlapping, scandals all ultimately contributed to the construction of a 
masculine model of politics. Though historian Rosemarie Zagarri has highlighted 
how the redefinition of political participation in terms of male-only activities like 
voting or office-holding limited political opportunities for women, her narrative 
ends prematurely with the election of Andrew Jackson.411 In fact, Jackson’s election 
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only began this process for Washington’s elite political culture while it was still 
underway in mass political culture. 
 The narratives of moral censorship and political conspiracy articulated in the 
elite arena shared a fundamental assumption – politics was a masculine activity. For 
Jackson, the autonomous exercise of political power by women was so unthinkable 
that a vast conspiracy embracing his family, Cabinet and Vice-President seemed a 
more plausible explanation for the boycott of Margaret Eaton. Likewise, the 
successful exercise of their influence to exclude Margaret required elite women to 
define it as non-political in nature. Though Jackson never achieved her social 
acceptance, nonetheless his efforts severely curtailed elite female power, as did the 
advent of institutionalised political parties – alternative extra-official power 
structures – under his presidency.412  
 Though curtailed, elite female involvement in Washington’s networks of 
power and patronage survived to the Civil War. Only recently, Cameron had repaid 
a ‘trifling service [Margaret] had done’ him ‘in the days of her power... by 
conferring some military appointment on her grandchild.’413 Margaret had also 
obtained the post of assistant Librarian to the House of Representatives for her 
newlywed third husband.414 However, the aftermath of the newspaper war 
rendered the invisibility of elite female power an imperative, lest it provoke a 
similar reaction among the electorate. This is evidenced by the paradoxical role of 
Jessie Frémont in her husband’s 1856 presidential campaign. The most popular 
campaign tale told about Jessie described her refusal to lobby her husband at the 
urging of pro-slavery women. Jessie’s normative behaviour – refusing to forsake her 
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domestic role to intrude into the masculine political realm – was contrasted against 
the ‘corrupted femininity’ of the pro-slavery women, who assumed political roles so 
their domestic duties would continue to be performed by slaves. In a supreme 
irony, Jessie herself crafted this anecdote – a fact concealed by Republicans in 
accordance with widespread hostility to female involvement in politics.415   
 Likewise, the Telegraph’s narrative of malign influence and the Globe’s 
narrative of injured innocence shared this fundamental assumption. Whether 
Margaret intruded herself upon the political realm or was dragged in by 
opportunists, this was a world to which she simply did not belong. The exposure of 
female power at the heart of the republic shocked the electorate; crystallising a 
previously inchoate hostility towards female influence into a key precept of mass 
political culture. Women themselves internalised and disseminated these values. 
Hostility to female power became a staple of the didactic literature written by and 
for women.  Literary figure Lydia Sigourney warned against ‘the admixture of the 
female mind in the ferment of political contention.’ In history, when ‘the gentler sex 
[has] usurped the spectre of the monarch’ the results were disastrous – ‘cabinet-
councils perplexed by intrigue or turbulent with contention.’416 Writing in 1838, she 
may well have been referring to the Cabinet dissensions wrought by Margaret 
Eaton. In 1839, Margaret Coxe wrote that a ‘female politician is only less disgusting 
than a female infidel’ – both antithetical to ideal womanhood.417  
 From the 1830s onwards, women could only legitimately access the public 
sphere by defining issues as domestic or their purposes as moral – following in the 
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footsteps of the Washington ladies. By casting activism in temperance or abolitionist 
movements as extensions of their traditional feminine roles and responsibilities, 
women avoided provoking male ire through an intrusion upon the ‘masculine turf’ 
of politics.418 The Eaton Affair, then, left a far greater mark upon history than most 
historians have admitted, and deserves to be treated as more than simply a 
titillating anecdote that enlivens the pages of a dry and dusty tome recounting the 
Age of Jackson. 
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